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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the advancement of Fiber-Wireless (FiWi) access technologies, through
the development of algorithms for resource allocation and energy efficient routing. FiWi access
networks use both optical and wireless/cellular technologies to provide high bandwidth and
ubiquity, required by users and current high demanding services.
FiWi access technologies are divided in two parts. In one of the parts, fiber is brought
from the central office to near the users, while in the other part wireless routers or base stations
take over and provide Internet access to users. Many technologies can be used at both the
optical and wireless parts, which lead to different integration and optimization problems to be
solved. In this thesis, the focus will be on FiWi access networks that use a passive optical
network at the optical section and a wireless mesh network at the wireless section. In such
networks, two important aspects that influence network performance are: allocation of resources
and traffic routing throughout the mesh section. In this thesis, both problems are addressed. A
fair bandwidth allocation algorithm is developed, which provides fairness in terms of bandwidth
and in terms of experienced delays among all users. As for routing, an energy efficient routing
algorithm is proposed that optimizes sleeping and productive periods throughout the wireless
and optical sections.
To develop the stated algorithms, game theory and networks formation theory were used.
These are powerful mathematical tools that can be used to solve problems involving agents with
conflicting interests. Since, usually, these tools are not common knowledge, a brief survey on
game theory and network formation theory is provided to explain the concepts that are used
throughout the thesis. As such, this thesis also serves as a showcase on the use of game theory
and network formation theory to develop new algorithms.
Keywords: Fiber-Wireless Access Networks, Wireless Mesh Network, Bandwidth Allocation,
Routing, Energy Efficiency, Game Theory, Network Formation Theory.
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Resumo
Esta tese e´ uma contribuic¸a˜o para o desenvolvimento das redes de acesso. Mais especificamente,
contribui para o avanc¸o das redes de acesso hı´bridas fiber-wireless (FiWi) atrave´s do desenvolvi-
mento de algoritmos para a alocac¸a˜o de recursos e para um encaminhamento de tra´fego ener-
geticamente eficiente. As redes de acesso FiWi usam uma mistura de tecnologias: tecnologia
o´tica, com capacidade para fornecer a elevada largura de banda requerida pelos novos servic¸os,
e tecnologia sem fios (ou celular) para responder a` ubiquidade exigida pelos utilizadores. De-
vido a` sua flexibilidade e elevado potencial, este tipo de redes tem recebido muita atenc¸a˜o por
parte da comunidade cientı´fica.
As redes de acesso FiWi possuem duas secc¸o˜es principais. Numa delas, a fibra o´tica e´
trazida da central ate´ a` vizinhanc¸a dos utilizadores; na outra, roteadores sem fios ou estac¸o˜es de
base espalhados por uma determinada a´rea proporcionam aos utilizadores o acesso a` Internet.
Qualquer das secc¸o˜es pode incorporar va´rias tecnologias e o uso de diferentes combinac¸o˜es
dessas tecnologias acaba por levantar diferentes problemas de integrac¸a˜o. Esta tese foca-se em
redes FiWi que exploram, numa das secc¸o˜es, uma rede o´tica passiva, e na outra, uma rede em
malha sem fios. Os pacotes que circulam neste tipo de redes em malha podem ter que passar por
mu´ltiplos roteadores, consumindo recursos em todos eles. Assim, tanto a alocac¸a˜o de recursos
como o roteamento do tra´fego pela rede em malha sem fios sa˜o componentes importantes para
a obtenc¸a˜o de um bom desempenho, sendo ambas estudadas nesta tese.
Para estudar e melhorar as componentes descritas foram usadas ferramentas matema´ticas,
nomeadamente, teoria de jogos e teoria de formac¸a˜o de redes. Tratam-se de ferramentas com
enorme potencial e que podem ser usadas para estudar e perceber como otimizar situac¸o˜es
que envolvem va´rios agentes com interesses conflituosos. Embora maioritariamente utilizadas
no domı´nio das aplicac¸o˜es econo´micas, sa˜o ferramentas suficientemente a´geis para utilizac¸a˜o
noutros terrenos, como ja´ foi demonstrado, por exemplo, em trabalhos de biologia e de cieˆncias
da computac¸a˜o. No entanto, tratam-se de ferramentas pouco utilizadas no aˆmbito das redes
de computadores e das telecomunicac¸o˜es, terreno onde ainda sa˜o pouco conhecidas. Por esse
motivo e´ apresentada nesta tese uma breve explicac¸a˜o de todos os conceitos de teoria de jogos
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e formac¸a˜o de redes que foram utilizados ao longo dos estudos efetuados. Deste modo, a partir
dos exemplos nela descritos, a tese contribui tambe´m como ferramenta de estudo para quem
precise de perceber como se resolvem problemas envolvendo agentes com conflitos de interesse
e, com base nessas aquisic¸o˜es, desenvolver algoritmos para a obtenc¸a˜o dos resultados desejados,
aplica´veis, neste caso, a`s redes FiWi.
Apo´s a apresentac¸a˜o de todos os conceitos matema´ticos utilizados, e´ apresentada uma pri-
meira aplicac¸a˜o desses conceitos a uma rede FiWi onde todos os roteadores sa˜o agentes inter-
essados, sobretudo, em encaminhar tra´fego dos seus pro´prios utilizadores, ignorando tra´fego
pertencente a utilizadores conectados a outros roteadores. Isto significa que os roteadores na˜o
va˜o querer usar os seus recursos com utilizadores com os quais na˜o estejam diretamente conec-
tados. E´ desenvolvido um modelo matema´tico do problema baseado em teoria de jogos, e sa˜o
extraı´das as condic¸o˜es para que exista um equilı´brio onde os roteadores cooperam encamin-
hando tra´fego uns dos outros.
Como ja´ mencionado, a alocac¸a˜o inteligente de recursos e´ um dos fatores-chave para me-
lhorar o desempenho das redes de acesso FiWi. Com o objetivo de conceber um algoritmo de
alocac¸a˜o de largura de banda e´ desenvolvido um modelo baseado em teoria de jogos no qual
os roteadores pretendem maximizar a quantidade de tra´fego entregue com sucesso e minimizar
a perda de pacotes. O objetivo de minimizar a perda de pacotes esta´ relacionado com o facto
de tais pacotes ja´ terem consumido alguns recursos dos roteadores por onde passaram, recursos
esses que tera˜o sido desperdic¸ados ou, por outras palavras, na˜o tera˜o sido produtivos. Acresce
que estes pacotes provocam ainda algum atraso no envio de outros pacotes. O modelo desen-
volvido fornece as bases para um algoritmo de alocac¸a˜o de largura de banda eficiente e justo,
isto e´, onde todos os roteadores teˆm as mesmas oportunidades de acesso a` largura de banda.
Deste modo, os roteadores com mais tra´fego na˜o ira˜o consumir todos os recursos, deixando
os outros roteadores sem nenhuma largura de banda disponı´vel. Para ale´m de iguais opor-
tunidades no acesso a` largura de banda, o algoritmo e´ tambe´m capaz de fornecer tempos de
espera equivalentes entre os utilizadores. Esta caracterı´stica facilita a implementac¸a˜o de sis-
temas que fornec¸am qualidade de servic¸o. No entanto, se o fornecedor do servic¸o assim o
desejar, e´ possı´vel definir algum nı´vel de desigualdade nas oportunidades de acesso atrave´s da
configurac¸a˜o de um paraˆmetro.
Quanto ao encaminhamento de tra´fego, primeiro e´ estudado o estabelecimento de rotas de
modo a aumentar a eficieˆncia energe´tica e a quantidade de tra´fego entregue com sucesso. Para
tal e´ desenvolvido um modelo baseado em teoria de formac¸a˜o de redes cujo objetivo e´ perceber
como podem ser estabelecidas as rotas de maneira a otimizar os tempos produtivos, aqueles
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em que os dispositivos esta˜o a enviar ou receber tra´fego, e os tempos em standby, aqueles em
que os dispositivos esta˜o em modo de poupanc¸a de energia. Para ser possı´vel contabilizar a
energia consumida a abordagem adotada neste modelo foi diferente. Uma vez que a rede na
secc¸a˜o sem fios e´ em malha, o tra´fego pertencente aos utilizadores de um roteador influencia
a energia consumida em todos os roteadores por onde esse tra´fego passa. Assim, o roteador
de origem (no caso de tra´fego upstream) ou destino (no caso de tra´fego downstream), devera´
ser responsabilizado por parte da energia consumida nos roteadores por onde o seu tra´fego e´
encaminhado. Omodelo desenvolvido permite perceber quais as rotas que teˆm um impacto mais
positivo na eficieˆncia energe´tica e, sempre que possı´vel, que permitam aumentar a quantidade de
tra´fego entregue com sucesso. Com esse conhecimento foi possı´vel desenvolver uma heurı´stica
para o estabelecimento de rotas eficientes tanto do ponto de vista energe´tico como da entrega
bem sucedida de tra´fego. Este algoritmo consegue ser computacionalmente eficiente, uma vez
que se dedica a otimizar os tempos produtivos e em standby nos dispositivos onde surte mais
efeito.
Palavras chave: Redes de Acesso Hı´bridas de Fibra e Sem Fios, Redes Sem Fios em Malha,
Alocac¸a˜o de Largura de Banda, Roteamento, Eficieˆncia Energe´tica, Teoria de Jogos, Teoria de
Formac¸a˜o de Redes.
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C H A P T E R 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Scope
Bandwidth requirements of multimedia services have been constantly growing and, as a result,
current copper based access technologies will no longer be able to cope with the needed re-
quirements [1, 2]. Optical fiber was chosen as the preferred medium to replace copper wires.
The reason behind this preference is related with its huge bandwidth capacity and long range
communication without needing amplifiers or signal regenerators [1, 2]. As such, many optical
access networks have already been installed, either to replace older copper installations or in
new installations where no network infrastructures existed before [3–5].
Passive optical networks (PONs) are the most common optical access networks, either Eth-
ernet PONs (EPONs) or Gigabit PONs (GPONs). These technologies provide the needed band-
width for demanding services such as the internet protocol television (IPTV), high-definition
television (HDTV), voice over internet protocol (VoIP) and Internet, all coexisting and being
served by the same network structure [3–6]. Moreover, these protocols are future proof and new
generations of these technologies are under heavy development, which will coexist with current
PON installations [7–12].
Albeit all the advantages of optical fiber, users also want Internet access everywhere and
fiber can not provide it. One possible solution is to combine fiber with wireless or cellular
technologies. This way, high bandwidth and ubiquity will be provided [13–15]. These net-
works are termed Fiber-Wireless (FiWi) access networks and have been receiving considerable
research attention in recent years due to their potential. In these cross-domain access networks,
the optical and wireless domains can have different levels of integration [15–19]. Nevertheless,
all FiWi access networks are divided in two parts. The first part is termed back end, which is
where fiber is brought from the central office (CO) to near the users. From there, at the front
end, wireless routers or base stations take over, providing Internet access to users. Many differ-
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ent technologies can be used at both front and back end. The most common approach is to use
a PON at the back end and 802.11, worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX)
or long term evolution (LTE) at the front end [14, 16].
This thesis focuses on studying and contributing to the state of the art of FiWi access net-
works with a wireless mesh front end. Such front end provides great flexibility in terms of
coverage, bandwidth allocation and routing, which is exploited in this thesis [14, 15]. For in-
stance, in such front end, packets may have to travel through several wireless hops before they
reach the optical link at the back end. Two major building blocks to increase the performance
on such networks are the design of efficient routing schemes and the design of efficient packet
scheduling policies [14, 15]. To pursue such demand, game theory and network formation the-
ory were used. These are powerful mathematical tools that have been extensively used in many
other fields but have rarely been used in network communications research. However, they can
also be applied to communication networks, FiWi access networks in our case, to help solve
problems and improve the performance [20, 21].
1.2 Objectives
This thesis is intended to contribute to the advance of FiWi access networks by:
 Showcasing the use of game theory and network formation theory as powerful mathemat-
ical tools to help in the analysis of several problems and development of new algorithms.
 Developing a bandwidth allocation algorithm that provides fairness both in terms of band-
width and delays to all wireless routers. Such fairness among users opens way for traffic
differentiation and quality of service (QoS) provisioning.
 Developing an energy efficient routing algorithm. Such algorithm tries to choose the
routes that most optimize active and sleeping periods at all nodes in order to improve the
number of bytes sent/received per each Joule consumed.
1.3 Contributions
Several research articles have been published or are being finalized as a result of the work de-
veloped in this thesis. In [22], it is shown how repeated game theory can be used as a framework
for the development of algorithms to be applied in communication networks. Game theory is
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usually used as an analytical tool, however, in this article, its potential as a tool to help in the
development of algorithms is highlighted and explored.
The object of study in this thesis is the FiWi access network technology. Lately, much
attention is being devoted to such networks, due to their high bandwidth, ubiquity and flexibility.
In [23] a survey on FiWi access networks is presented along with all the enabling technologies.
That is, current and developing optical, wireless and cellular technologies are surveyed in order
to understand their importance and potential when used together in FiWi access networks.
In [24, 25], game theory was applied to the problem of traffic forwarding in FiWi access
networks where every wireless router is a selfish player mainly interested in forwarding traffic
that belongs to its directly connected users. Nash equilibrium was then obtained, as well as the
necessary conditions for such equilibrium to occur. These articles served as an initial study on
how to apply game theory concepts to FiWi access networks.
Besides predicting outcomes, game theory can also be used as a framework to develop
new algorithms. In [26], game theory was used to help in the development of a fair bandwidth
allocation algorithm. The algorithm is efficient and is able to provide fairness among all wireless
nodes, both in terms of access to bandwidth and experienced delays. Such fairness is important
because it opens way to the QoS provisioning that new services require.
Energy efficiency has also been receiving much attention by the research community. In [27,
28], the establishment of energy efficient routes is studied through network formation theory.
Instead of taking into consideration the total energy expenditure, it was decided that the average
amount of sent/received bytes per Joule would be the focus. Insights are given on how energy
efficiency can be improved by establishing routes that optimize active and sleeping periods. In
[28], the work from [27] is improved and more energy efficient methods are proposed, including
an heuristic algorithm.
More details on the contributions will be given in every chapter.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the motivation for this work, clari-
fies what is the scope, states the objectives, exhibits the contributions and details the outline.
Chapter 2 presents theoretical concepts that are used throughout. More specifically, game
theory and network formation theory. Note that, only the needed concepts to understand the
forthcoming chapters are given in order to avoid an extensive exposure of concepts.
Chapter 3 introduces FiWi access networks. It starts by introducing the current state of the
3
1.4. THESIS OUTLINE
art of optical and wireless networks. Afterwards, the attention is focused on FiWi access net-
works, i.e. on the different integrations considered and architectures proposed in the literature.
Chapter 4 shows a direct application of game theoretical concepts to a FiWi access network.
Nash equilibrium is derived along with the necessary conditions. This chapter is based on the
work published in [24, 25].
Chapter 5 presents the development of a fair bandwidth allocation algorithm. In order to
achieve that goal, a repeated game model was created to serve as a basic structure. This chapter
is based on the work published in [26].
Chapter 6 studies energy efficient routing and develops a heuristic algorithm for the estab-
lishment of such efficient routes. A network formation model is presented, which is used to
gain insights on how energy efficient routes can be established. Based on the obtained insights,
a heuristic algorithm is then developed to establish energy efficient routes with a small execution
time. This chapter is based on the work published in [27, 28].
Chapter 7 finalizes the thesis with some conclusions and presents some topics for future
work.
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Game Theory
2.1 Introduction
Game theory is a mathematical tool that can be used to study situations with two or more agents
with conflicting interests. That is, it allows to predict the outcome of situations where individual
decisions can influence other agents. Game theory has mainly been used for economical studies
and practical decision-making [29]. It has also been applied in many other fields such as biology
or, more recently, computer science and computer networks [20,29]. Moreover, it laid down the
foundations for modern disciplines such as mechanism/market design and algorithmic game
theory [30, 31]. In computer networks, it can be used to model and study situations where
different devices have different interests that may affect each other. Various kinds of problems
can be modeled for analytical purposes or to act as a support model for algorithm development
[20, 32, 33].
In this chapter, an introduction to game theory and network formation is given. Only the
concepts needed to understand the forthcoming chapters are introduced, in order to avoid an
excessively and unnecessarily exposure of concepts. The next section starts by introducing
one-stage games and how the outcome of a game can be predicted. Afterwards, in Section
2.3, games composed of many stages are presented and their differences from the one-stage
games are highlighted. In Section 2.4, finite-horizon and infinite-horizon repeated games are
explained, as well as how the predicted outcome of an infinite-horizon repeated game can be
different from the finite-horizon equivalent. The chapter ends with a short summary of all the
introduced notions.
Contributions:
i) Survey on game theory and network formation theory.
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d1d2 p1 p2
Figure 2.1: Forwarder’s dilemma representation.
Publications:
The work in this chapter is to be published in [22].
2.2 One-Stage Games
As aforementioned, game theory can be used to model and study situations where agents have
conflicting interests. One example of such a situation is the widely known prisoner’s dilemma,
which is usually presented as follows [29]. Two men are arrested, but the police does not have
enough information for them to be convicted. Both prisoners are then interrogated separately
and at the same time. Each prisoner can choose to stay silent or betray the other. If both stay
silent, both will go to prison for just 1 month. If one prisoner betrays the other, while the other
stays silent, then the silent prisoner goes to prison for 12 months and the betrayer goes free for
cooperating with the police. Finally, if both prisoners betray each other, then both will go to
prison for 3 months. The question is what will prisoners do, assuming that none of them can be
sure if the other will betray or stay silent. If both stay silent, both get a minor sentence of one
month. However, each prisoner may feel tempted to betray the other in order to be freed. As a
result, both may end up betraying each other. Hence the dilemma.
In [34], a conceptually similar version of the prisoner’s dilemma is presented. It is called
the forwarder’s dilemma and will be used throughout this chapter to help explaining some
definitions. The game can be explained as follows. There are two players, router p1 and router
p2, that want to send a packet to d1 and d2, respectively. As shown in Figure 2.1, for d1 to
receive the packet from p1, p2 will have to cooperate and forward the packet. Conversely, the
same applies for the packet from p2 sent to d2. If a packet reaches its destination, then the player
who sent it receives a payment of 1. A player that chooses to forward the packet of the opponent
is incurred a cost of C, where 0 < C << 1. This cost represents the consumption of resources
to forward foreign traffic.
The question is whether or not players in the forwarder’s dilemma will cooperate with each
other by forwarding packets. If both players cooperate, then both will receive a payoff of 1 C.
However, a player might feel tempted to defect in order to receive a payoff of 1, which is
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Table 2.1: Forwarder’s dilemma in normal form.
p2
F D
p1
F (1  C; 1  C) ( C; 1)
D (1; C) (0; 0)
the highest payoff in this game, leaving a payoff of  C for the opponent. In non-cooperative
one-stage games, it is assumed that players decide at the same time what will be their actions
without any communication or coordination among them. That is, neither of the players knows
beforehand what will the the action of the opponent. As a safe precaution, both players might
defect by not forwarding the packet of the opponent. This way, a defecting player can rest
assured that at least he will not receive a negative payoff,  C. However, both could receive a
higher payoff by cooperating. Hence the dilemma.
2.2.1 Normal and Strategic Form Representations
Games can be represented in many different forms. One of the most common is the normal form
representation, which is very useful for simple games with two players and only a few available
actions to each player [29,35]. This representation consists of a table, where the lines represent
the strategies of one player and the columns represent the strategies of the other player. The cell
that results from the intersection of the row and column contains the payoffs that both players
will receive. Considering the just presented forwarder’s dilemma, there are two players, p1 and
p2, which can forward or drop the packet, represented by F and D, respectively. The normal
form representation of the forwarder’s dilemma is shown in Table 2.1. The rows represent the
actions available to p1, while the columns represent the actions available to p2. As already told,
the cell resulting from the chosen line and column contains the payoffs that both players will
receive. For instance, if p1 forwards and p2 drops the packet, then the resulting cell contains
( C; 1), which means that p1 receives a payoff of  C and p2 receives a payoff of 1. The tuple
including the strategy chosen by each player is called strategy profile. In the example just used,
where p1 forwards and p2 drops, the strategy profile is (F;D).
The normal form representation is good for simple examples, however, for games with
many players and multiple strategies, it is impossible to use the normal representation. For
those cases, the strategic form is the most suited. In this form, a game is represented by 
 =
fP ;S;Ug, where P represents the set of players, S represents the set of all strategy profiles and
U represents the set of utility functions, explained next [29, 34, 35].
7
2.2. ONE-STAGE GAMES
The set of all strategy profiles can be obtained by S = i2PSi, where Si is the set of
all strategies available to player i.1 In game theory literature, for convenience, the set of all
players except i is denoted by  i. This way, one can represent a strategy profile (si; s i) that is
composed of a specific strategy from i, si 2 Si, and any combination of strategies from all other
players, s i 2 S i. As for the set of utility functions, U = fuiji 2 Pg, it includes the payoffs
that each player receives as a result from the chosen strategy profile, i.e. ui : S ! R [29,34,35].
Players in a game can have complete or incomplete information. In a complete informa-
tion game, every player i 2 P knows everything about the game he is involved in. More
specifically, every player i 2 P knows all the other players, their available strategies and the re-
spective payoffs. Moreover, every player knows that the opponents also have that information.
This knowledge can be used to intelligently choose strategies that provide the highest possible
payoffs [29, 34, 35].
On the other hand, in a game with incomplete information, players do not know which
strategies are available to the opponents, neither the resulting payoffs. Certain beliefs might be
known about the opponents but those are not accurate and, as such, the behavior of players can
be different. In this thesis, only complete information games will be used.
Definition 2.1 (Complete Information Game) A game with complete information is a game
where every player i 2 P knows all the other players, their available strategies and all payoffs
that they receive as result from the chosen strategy profiles.
2.2.2 Dominated Strategies
In game theory, players choose their strategies in order to receive the highest possible payoff.
Thus, it can be expected that strategies that never lead to high payoffs will never be chosen.
Considering the game from Table 2.2, taken from [29], player p2 will never choose strategy z2.
That is because greater payoffs can be obtained by p2, either by choosing x2 or y2, no matter
how his opponent plays. In this case, it is said that strategy z2 is strongly dominated [29,34,35].
Definition 2.2 (Strong Dominance) Strategy s0i of player i is strongly dominated if for any
s i 2 S i, there exists at least one si 6= s0i such that ui (s0i; s i) < ui (si; s i).
1The symbol 00 represents the Cartesian product. Hence, i2PSi = f(s1; s2; : : : ;
sjPj

: s1 2 S1 ^ s2 2 S2 ^ : : : ^ sjPj 2 SjPj
	
.
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Table 2.2: Example of a game with one strongly dominated strategy, taken from [29].
p2
x2 y2 z2
p1
x1 (2; 3) (3; 0) (0; 1)
y1 (0; 0) (1; 6) (4; 2)
Table 2.3: Game from Table 2.2 with the strongly dominated strategy eliminated.
p2
x2 y2
p1
x1 (2; 3) (3; 0)
y1 (0; 0) (1; 6)
Strongly dominated strategies can be removed from the game, since intelligent players
would never choose them. In the case of the game from Table 2.2, if strategy z2 is elimi-
nated, then the resulting game will be the one in Table 2.3. Note that in the resulting game,
after elimination of z2, strategy y1 of p1 also becomes strongly dominated and, therefore, can
be removed. This elimination process of strongly dominated strategies is called iterative elim-
ination [29, 34, 35]. At the end, for the given example, only one strategy for each player will
remain, x1 for p1 and x2 for p2. Since strategy profile (x1; x2) is expected to be chosen, p1 will
receive a payoff of 2 and p2 will receive a payoff of 3.
Strategies can also be weakly dominated [29, 34, 35].
Definition 2.3 (Weak Dominance) Strategy s0i of player i is weakly dominated if for any s i 2
S i, there exists at least one si 6= s0i such that ui (s0i; s i)  ui (si; s i), with strict inequality
for at least one s i 2 S i.
Removing weakly dominated strategies by iterative elimination can also be done, however,
it can lead to unexpected results. Considering the game from Table 2.4, taken from [36], p1 has
two weakly dominated strategies, x1 and y1. In Figure 2.2, it is possible to see how eliminating
x1 or y1 first can lead to different results. That is, the order in which weakly dominated strategies
are eliminated can lead to different outcomes. Such situation does not happen with strongly
dominated strategies, because elimination does not cause strongly dominated strategies to cease
being strongly dominated. On the other hand, a weakly dominated strategy can cease being
dominated if other strategies are removed.
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Table 2.4: Example of a game with weakly dominated strategies, taken from [36].
p2
x2 y2
p1
x1 (1; 0) (0; 2)
y1 (0; 2) (2; 0)
z1 (1; 1) (2; 1)
p1
p2
x1
y1
z1
x2 y2
(1,0)
(0,2)
(1,1)
(0,2)
(2,0)
(2,1)
p1
p2
y1
z1
x2 y2
(0,2)
(1,1)
(2,0)
(2,1)
p1
p2
x1
z1
x2 y2
(1,0)
(1,1)
(0,2)
(2,1)
p1
p2
y1
z1
x2
(0,2)
(1,1)
p1
p2
x1
z1
y2
(0,2)
(2,1)
p1
p2
z1
x2
(1,1)
p1
p2
z1
y2
(2,1)
Re
mo
ve
 x 1
Rem
ove y
1
Remove y2
Remove x2
Remove y1
Remove x1
Figure 2.2: Difference between two alternative iterative eliminations of weakly dominated strategies.
2.2.3 Nash Equilibrium
It is not always possible to predict the outcome of a game through iterative elimination. For
instance, the game in Table 2.5, taken from [29], has no dominated strategies. Nevertheless, it
is still possible to predict what will be the outcome of the game. For that, the notion of best
response needs to be introduced [29, 34, 35].
Definition 2.4 (Best Response) The best response of player i is a function bri (s i) that outputs
which strategy should be chosen by player i in order to receive the highest possible payoff, given
that the opponents will play s i. That is, bri (s i) = argmaxsi2Si ui (si; s i).
In the game from Table 2.5, the strategy x1 from p1 is the best response to strategy x2 from p2.
Strategy x2, in its turn, is the best response to strategy z1. One interesting strategy profile is
the one where p1 plays y1 and p2 plays y2, with the payoff (1; 1). In this case, y1 is the best
response to y2 and, conversely, y2 is the best response to y1. This strategy profile is actually
the expected outcome of this game, since none of the players has any incentive to unilaterally
choose a different strategy. That is, if p1 plays x1 or y1, its payoff will decrease, considering
that p2 does not change its strategy. Similarly, p2 will also not change to x2 or z2 because its
payoff will decrease, since p1 is playing y1. This type of strategy profiles, where no player has
any incentive to deviate, is termed Nash equilibrium [29, 34, 35].
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Table 2.5: Example of a game without dominated strategies, taken from [29].
p2
x2 y2 z2
p1
x1 (3; 0) (0; 2) (0; 3)
y1 (2; 0) (1; 1) (2; 0)
z1 (0; 3) (0; 2) (3; 0)
Definition 2.5 (Nash Equilibrium) A strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium if ui
 
si ; s

 i
 
ui
 
si; s

 i

;8si 2 Si; si 6= si ; 8i 2 P , with at least one strict inequality.
It is possible to have more than one Nash equilibrium in one game. In the example from
Table 2.4, both strategies obtained through iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies,
(z1; x2) and (z1; y2), are actually Nash equilibrium strategies. Indeed, strategy profiles obtained
by iterative elimination are always Nash equilibrium profiles. Note, however, that in the case
of iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, the resulting profiles are a subset of the
Nash equilibrium profiles, meaning that there might be more Nash equilibrium profiles [29]. As
for iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies, the resulting profile is the only Nash
equilibrium, as in the game from Table 2.2 [29].
Nash equilibrium, as shown, predicts what will be the outcome of a game. For example,
in the forwarder’s dilemma from Table 2.1, the Nash equilibrium profile is (D;D). Note that
this outcome is not the most efficient, since both players could receiver greater payoffs if the
profile (F; F ) was played instead. However, any player might feel tempted do defect in order
to receive the highest payoff of 1. As a precaution, both players end up choosing D in order to
avoid receiving  C. This means that Nash equilibrium only predicts what will be the natural
choices of intelligent players that do not trust each other or have no prior arrangement related
to which strategies will be used. As such, Nash equilibrium, in many games, is not the most
efficient outcome. The challenge resides in designing systems where players, routers in the case
of the forwarder’s dilemma, have incentives to cooperate, forward traffic from each other in the
case of the forwarder’s dilemma [30, 31, 33].
In game theory, the strategy profile (F; F ) of the forwarder’s dilemma is said to be Pareto
superior to the other profiles.
Definition 2.6 (Pareto Superior) A strategy profile s 2 S is Pareto superior to s0 2 S if
ui (si; s i)  ui
 
s0i; s
0
 i

;8i 2 P , with at least one strict inequality.
The most efficient outcome in a game would be one with the highest payoffs for every player,
(F; F ) in the case of the forwarder’s dilemma. This efficient outcome has the particularity that
11
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Table 2.6: Example of a game without pure Nash equilibrium, taken from [37].
p2
x2 y2
p1
x1 (1; 1) ( 1; 1)
y1 ( 1; 1) (1; 1)
there is no other profile that is Pareto superior to it [29, 34, 35].
Definition 2.7 (Pareto Optimal) A strategy profile s 2 S is Pareto optimal if there is no other
strategy that is Pareto superior to s.
There are cases where Nash equilibrium is Pareto optimal. In such cases, it is said that Nash
equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Naturally, the most desired Nash equilibrium is the Pareto effi-
cient one, since payoffs are higher.
2.2.4 Mixed Strategies
Until now, in this chapter, it has been assumed that players choose one specific strategy to
be played and the expected outcome of the game is a Nash equilibrium profile. However, in
some games, Nash equilibrium may not exist, as shown in the example from Table 2.6, taken
from [37].
Instead of specifically choosing which strategy should be played, players can define a prob-
abilistic distribution over their available strategies. In the example from Table 2.6, a Nash
equilibrium would exist if both players define a probability of 1=2 over each of their strategies,
as it will become clear next. Such distribution is termed mixed strategy [37].
Definition 2.8 (Mixed Strategy) A mixed strategy i is a distribution over the strategies of i,
Si.
The set of all mixed strategies from a player i 2 P is denoted by i (capital of ). Similarly
to strategy profiles, s 2 S , mixed strategy profiles can be defined by  = i2Pi. From here
on, to avoid confusion, the set of profiles in S will be called pure strategy profiles, while the
profiles in  will be termed mixed strategy profiles.
Since mixed strategies define probabilities over the set of available pure strategies, the utility
function in this case reveals the expected payoff based on the chosen mixed profile  [29,35,37]:
ui () =
X
s2S
"
ui (s)
Y
j2P
j (sj)
#
; (2.1)
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where sj is the strategy of j in profile s and, j (sj) represents the probability of sj being chosen.
Since ui (s) is the payoff of i when the pure strategy profile s =
 
s1; s2; : : : ; sjPj

is played and,Q
j2P j (sj) is the probability of s being chosen if the mixed profile  =
 
1; 2; : : : ; jPj

is
used, then ui (s)
Q
j2P j (sj) represents the expected payoff of i.
Reconsidering the game from Table 2.6, assuming p1 chooses x1 with probability qx1 and
p2 chooses x2 with probability qx2 , then the expected payoff for p1 can be calculated by:
up1 () = [1qx1qx2 ] + [ 1qx1 (1  qx2)] + [ 1 (1  qx1) qx2 ] + [1 (1  qx1) (1  qx2)] ; (2.2)
where 1 and  1 are the payoffs that p1 would receive according to the different pure strategy
profiles, shown in Table 2.6. As aforementioned, Nash equilibrium will exist, in this case, for
qx1 = qx2 = 1=2, meaning that in this mixed Nash equilibrium both players will receive a payoff
of 0. According to [29, 35], every game with a finite set of strategies has at least one pure or
mixed Nash equilibrium. Note that a mixed Nash equilibrium profile is never Pareto optimal.
That is because a mixed profile is, in fact, a linear combination of pure strategies and, as such,
could not result in higher payoffs than the ones obtained by pure strategies.
2.3 Dynamic Games
One-stage games can only model situations where all players take their decisions at the same
time. However, many situations may be better modeled with games composed of several stages
[29, 35, 38]. For instance, in the forwarder’s dilemma, players may not have packets to send
at the same time. Let us assume that p2 is the first player with a packet to be sent, which p1
may or may not forward. Immediately after, p1 also sends a packet, which p2 can choose to
forward or not. Such games are termed dynamic games or multi-stage games. In this chapter,
and throughout the thesis, only dynamic games with perfect information are considered.
Definition 2.9 (Perfect Information) A dynamic game with perfect information is one where
every player i 2 P knows all the actions taken in previous stages by all opponents.
In the previous multi-stage forwarder’s dilemma example, p2 can decide whether or not to for-
ward based on the action of p1 in the previous stage.
Naturally, dynamic games need a different representation that must be capable of showing
the order in which players make their moves [29]. The extensive form representation, shown in
Figure 2.3 for the forwarder’s dilemma, is the most suited for these situations. The extensive
form consists of a tree structure where the root node represents the first decision in the game. In
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p1
(1-C,1-C) (-C,1) (1,-C) (0,0)
p2
F
F F
D
D D
p2
Figure 2.3: Two stage version of the forwarder’s dilemma, where p1 is the first player to move.
the previous example, the first decision belongs to p1. The lines with labels (F andD) represent
the actions available to the players. Player p1, at the first stage, can decide to forward, F , or to
drop, D, the packet from p2. The leafs of the tree contain the payoffs that players will receive
according to their decisions.
In multi-stage games, the player to move in the first stage has a set of strategies equal to
the ones available in the one-stage game. For instance, p1 from Figure 2.3 has the following
strategies available: Sp1 = fF;Dg. The players in the subsequent stages can take their de-
cisions based on the actions from previous stages. Player p2 from Figure 2.3, can decide its
action based on the move of p1 in the previous stage. For this reason, strategies for p2 will
be different in the multi-stage game. In this case, p2 has the following strategies available:
Sp2 = fFF; FD;DF;DDg. The first character in a strategy for p2 represents the action that
p2 takes if p1 chooses F in the first stage and the second character represents the action that
p2 takes if p1 chooses D. For instance, strategy (FD) means that p2 will forward if p1 has
forwarded in the previous stage and will drop if p1 has dropped.
2.3.1 Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction
The concept of Nash equilibrium in dynamic games is not different from one stage games.
That is, a strategy profile is Nash equilibrium if no player can increase its payoff by unilaterally
deviating. Considering the example from Figure 2.4, taken from [37], the pure Nash equilibrium
strategy profiles are: (H;DD), (H;DH) and (D;HH). These Nash equilibria can be found
more easily from the normal form equivalent game shown in Table 2.7. Note that the rows of the
table include the current possible moves for p1 (H and D) and the columns include the current
possible moves for p2 (HH , HD, DH and DD) that are based on the previous action of p1.
In strategy profile (D;HH), which is one of the Nash equilibrium profiles, p2 threatens to play
H regardless of the move from p1. Player p1 is aware of this threat and, as a result, could play
14
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p
1
(-2,-2) (6,0) (0,6) (3,3)
p2 p2
H
H H
D
D D
Figure 2.4: Example of a dynamic game taken from [37].
Table 2.7: Normal form equivalent for the game in Figure 2.4
p2
HH HD DH DD
p1
H ( 2; 2) ( 2; 2) (6; 0) (6; 0)
D (0; 6) (3; 3) (0; 6) (3; 3)
his best response to HH , which is strategy D. However, looking more closely at Figure 2.4, if
p1 chooses H in the first stage, then p2 is really not willing to choose H in the second stage,
sinceD would give p2 a better payoff. This kind of threats are termed empty threats, since p2 is
actually bluffing and HH does not represent a real threat [35, 37].
Finding Nash equilibrium strategy profiles in multi-stage games can lead to empty threats,
and their removal can be done through backward induction [35, 37]. This technique starts by
analyzing the most profitable action in the last stage and then, based on the most profitable
actions at the last stage, it is analyzed which is the most profitable action at the penultimate
stage. This analysis keeps proceeding upward in the tree structure until the root node is reached.
To exemplify this, let us assume the game from Figure 2.4. First, the action that results in the
highest payoff for p2 is determined, considering all the possible previous actions of p1. If p1
played H , then the best choice is for p2 to choose D. On the other hand, if p1 chose D, then
p2 will be better with H . Given the best moves of p2, it is possible decide which action results
in the highest payoff for p1. Clearly, p1 will be better by playing H , since it will give him a
higher payoff. In Figure 2.5, it is possible to see the result of the backward induction, where the
thick lines mark the best actions in every stage. The continuous route of thick lines from the
root to the leaf represents the predicted outcome of the game. Hence, (H;DD) and (H;DH)
are the predicted outcomes, since both these strategies lead to the actions chosen by backward
induction.
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p1
(-2,-2) (6,0) (0,6) (3,3)
p
2
p
2
H
H H
D
D D
Figure 2.5: Backward induction technique applied to the game in Figure 2.4. The continuous route of
thick lines from the root node to the leaf represents the predicted outcome of the game.
2.4 Repeated Games
Repeated games are a specific type of dynamic games where players face the same one-stage
game repeatedly [29, 35, 37, 38]. An example of a repeated game would be the repeated for-
warder’s dilemma, where the game in Table 2.1 is played repeatedly over several stages.
At every stage t, every player i 2 P has to choose his action. In the case of the forwarder’s
dilemma, in every stage t, every player chooses to forward or drop the packet. Since in this
thesis, only repeated games with perfect information are considered, the action at every stage
t can be chosen by considering the history of all previous moves, h (t). That is, the history of
previous moves is given as input to the strategy of every player to decide what will be the next
action, si (h (t)). Naturally, the strategy profile outputs the next profile of actions, s (h (t)) =
sp1 (h (t)) ; sp2 (h (t)) ; : : : ; spjPj (h (t))

.
2.4.1 Finite-Horizon Games and Nash Equilibrium
Repeated games can be finite-horizon, which means that the number of stages is limited, or
infinite-horizon, which means that players interact over an infinite number of stages [29, 37].
The payoff attributed to every player i 2 P of finite-horizon games can be calculated by sum-
ming the stage payoffs of all stages:
Ui (s) =
TX
t=0
ui (s (h (t))) ; (2.3)
where T is the last stage, ui is the stage payoff of player i and Ui is the total payoff. Ex-
emplifying with the repeated forwarder’s dilemma, and considering that both players are us-
ing a strategy that chooses F at every stage, the payoff attributed to both players would bePT
t=0 (1  C) = (T + 1) (1  C).
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To understand Nash equilibrium in finite-horizon games, let us keep considering the re-
peated forwarder’s dilemma. If both players played F until stage T   1, then one of the players
could deviate to D at the last stage T to increase his payoff. The opponent knows that, and to
avoid receiving  C at the last stage, he can also play D. Moreover, since it is predicted that
both players will play D at the last stage, then players can also deviate at the penultimate stage
in order to increase their payoff. Following this reasoning, the strategy profile that chooses the
action (D;D) at every stage is a Nash equilibrium of the finite-horizon repeated forwarder’s
dilemma. Note that this method, used to find Nash equilibrium, is similar to the backward
induction introduced in Section 2.3.1. Hence, any strategy profile that produces the outcome
predicted by the backward induction is a Nash equilibrium.
2.4.2 Infinite-Horizon Repeated Games and Nash Equilibrium
Infinite-horizon repeated games, as aforementioned, are played on forever. As such, the payoff
function of the finite-horizon game, shown in equation 2.3, can not be used for infinite-horizon
games because it could result in infinite payoffs. Instead, a weighted sum, termed discounted
payoff, is used [29, 37, 38]:
Ui (s) = (1  )
1X
t=0
tui (s (h (t))) ; (2.4)
where  is a weighting factor, termed discounting factor, that receives values between 0 and 1,
0 <  < 1. As for (1  ), it is responsible for normalizing the payoffs, allowing the compar-
ison between discounted payoffs and the payoffs received at every stage. For instance, in an
infinite-horizon repeated game where player i receives a stage payoff of 1 at all stages, the dis-
counted payoff for i will be 1. Note that as t grows, t decreases. Hence, stage payoffs become
less important as t grows, since the stage payoff is being multiplied by t. Furthermore, assign-
ing different values to  will influence how fast the stage payoffs loose importance, altering the
behavior of players and the Nash equilibrium profiles, as will be demonstrated next.
In infinite-horizon games, similarly to one-stage games, a strategy profile s 2 S is a Nash
equilibrium if:
Ui
 
si ; s

 i
  Ui  si; s i ;8si 2 Si;8i 2 P : (2.5)
However, in the case of infinite-horizon games, Nash equilibrium is greatly influenced by the
discounting factor and by the fact that the game is played on forever [29,37,38]. To exemplify it,
let us introduce the grim trigger strategy, which is widely used in game theoretical literature [29,
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37,38]. A player i using this strategy will exert effort in every stage, as long as the opponent also
cooperates. If the opponent shirks even only once, then i will stop cooperating from thereafter.
Applying this strategy to the forwarder’s dilemma, and labeling one of the players by i and the
opponent by j (if i = p1 then j = p2, if i = p2 then j = p1), grim trigger can be defined by the
following expression:
si (h (t)) =
(
F; if (si (h (t  1)) = F ) and (sj (h (t  1)) = F )
D; otherwise
(2.6)
If both players in the infinite-horizon repeated forwarder’s dilemma play this strategy, then they
will play F at all stages. The outcome of such strategy profile for both players will be:
(1  ) [(1  C) 0 + (1  C) 1 + : : :] = (1  ) [(1  C)P1t=0 t] =
= (1  ) (1  C) 1
1 

= (1  C) ;
If player i deviates at some stage t, then i will receive a higher payoff in that stage but will re-
ceive zero thereafter. The resulting discounted payoff for the deviating player can be calculated
by:
(1  ) (1  C) 0 + (1  C) 1 + : : :+ 1t + 0t+1 + 0t+2 + : : : =
= (1  )
h
(1  C)Pt 1t=0 t + ti = (1  ) h(1  C) 1 t1  + ti =
= (1  C)  1  t+ (1  ) t = (1  C)  t (1  C) + t (1  ) =
= (1  C) + tC   t = (1  C) + t (C   ) :
For the profile, where both players use grim trigger, to be Nash equilibrium, the deviation can
not be profitable for i. That is:
1  C  1  C + t (C   ), 0  t (C   ) :
Since 0 <  < 1, then   C for the inequality to hold. As long as the cost of forwarding a
packet, C, is lower than the discounting factor, , it is more profitable to follow the grim trigger
than deviating from it. This results in a Nash equilibrium profile where both players exert effort
by forwarding packets from each other.
As aforementioned and exemplified, the discounting factor is an important piece in the Nash
equilibrium of infinite-horizon repeated games. If  is close to 0, players are impatient. That
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is, players will give more relevance to the payoff of the current stage than payoffs in future
stages. In the forwarder’s dilemma example, if the cost is too high or  is too low, then players
will feel compelled to receive a higher immediate payoff, even if they will receive a lower
payoff thereafter. On the other hand, if  is close to 1, players will be more patient by giving
more relevance to future payoffs and, as such, will not deviate because it would result in lower
payoffs in future stages.
Folk Theorem
Many Nash equilibrium strategy profiles exist in infinite-horizon repeated games that do not ex-
ist in one-stage games. This allows for certain payoffs to be obtained that would not be possible
in Nash equilibrium of one-stage games. To understand which payoff values are possible, let us
introduce the min-max payoff [37, 38].
Definition 2.10 (Min-max Payoff) The min-max payoff for player i, ui, is defined as: ui =
mins i maxsi ui (si; s i).
That is, the min-max payoff is the lowest payoff that some player i can receive, provided that all
opponents will choose a strategy to minimize the payoff of i and i will choose the best response
to such strategy to maximize his payoff. In the case of the forwarder’s dilemma, this corresponds
to the payoff (0; 0), earned when both players playD. Any payoff greater or equal than the min-
max is possible to obtain by a Nash equilibrium strategy profile in an infinite-horizon repeated
game. In Figure 2.6, the min-max payoff in the infinite-horizon forwarder’s dilemma is shown
with thick lines. The gray area represents all feasible payoffs by Nash equilibrium strategies
[37, 38].
Definition 2.11 (Feasible Payoffs) The set of feasible payoff profiles is given by: fu = (u1;
u2; : : : ; ujPj

: ui  ui;8i 2 P
	
.
Provided that  is high enough, then any payoff in the feasible area can be obtained by a Nash
equilibrium strategy profile.
Theorem 2.1 (Folk Theorem) For every feasible payoff profile u 2 fu = (u1; u2; : : : ;
ujPj

: ui  ui; 8i 2 P
	
, there exists a discounting factor  < 1 such that for all  2 ]; 1[,
there is a Nash equilibrium profile with payoffs u.
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(0,0)
(1-C,1-C)
(-C,1)
(1,-C)
Figure 2.6: Illustration of the min-max and feasible payoffs of the infinite-horizon repeated forwarder’s
dilemma. The thick lines represent the min-max payoffs, while the gray area represents all feasible
payoffs.
2.5 Network Formation Theory
The formation of networks plays a significant role in many fields. Thus, it may be helpful to
study how such networks are formed, which connections are more important or which ones
are more likely to be established, and how efficient are the resulting network structures. For
instance, in labor economics, social networks are the main source of information about jobs
and, ultimately, many jobs are found through personal contacts [21, 39]. Understanding who
should be connected and how many connections should be established is important. In the
context of computer networks, wireless routers in a wireless mesh can establish connections
with neighbor wireless routers to route traffic in the most efficient way [27, 28].
Two different categories of network formation can be identified. In one of the categories,
connections are formed to serve one single entity. For instance, the routing of planes by an
airline or the establishment of distribution networks fall into this category [21,40]. In the second
category, connections are formed among several individuals or entities acting on their own. That
is, the entities themselves decide on what connections should be established or severed [21].
For instance, the establishment of connections by wireless routers in a wireless mesh network,
where every router decides which connections should be established, in a decentralized manner,
to route traffic. In this chapter, the focus will be on this second category.
Network formation theory is distinct from cooperative game theory. The outcome of co-
operative games depends solely on the formed coalitions and on which players are involved in
each coalition. Network formation theory, on the other hand, takes the full network structure
into account, i.e. who is connected to whom [21].
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1
2 3
Figure 2.7: Network example with P = f1; 2; 3g, LE = f13; 23g and LT = f12; 13; 23g.
2.5.1 Network Structure
In network formation theory, the individuals establishing connections among them are also
termed players, which may be people, organizations or wireless routers in a mesh network.
Like in previous sections of this chapter, let us denote the set of players by P .
An established connection between player i 2 P and player j 2 P , i 6= j, is denoted by
ij. The set of all established connections, i.e. all ij pairs, forms a network structure, which is
denoted byLE . In this thesis, it is assumed that all connections are undirected, i.e. ij , ji; 8i 2
P; 8j 2 P and i 6= j. Considering the example from Figure 2.7, P = f1; 2; 3g and LE =
f13; 23g. The set of all possible connections involving all possible pairs of players from P is
denoted by LT . Reconsidering the example from Figure 2.7, LT = f12; 13; 23g. The set of all
possible networks, denoted by L, is defined by L = LEjLE  LT	. All players with at least
one established connection belong to set PLE , which is defined as PLE = ij9ij 2 LE; j 6= i	.
As a result from the establishment of connections, paths and disconnected sub-networks, termed
components, may emerge [21].
Definition 2.12 (Path) A path between a player i 2 P and a player j 2 P is a sequence of con-
nections fi1i2; i2i3; : : : ; iK 1iKg, where i1 = i, iK = j and ikik+1 2 LE; k = f1; 2; : : : ; K   1g.
Definition 2.13 (Component) A component in a network LE is a sub-network LE0  LE such
that:
 if i 2 PLE0 and j 2 PLE0 , for i 6= j, then there exists a path between i and j, and
 if i 2 PLE0 and ij 2 LE , then ij 2 LE0 .
All components in LE are denoted by CLE . Note that according to this definition of component,
an isolated player without any connections, i.e. i =2 PLE , is not considered a component. To
denote the set of all components plus lone players, LE = CLE [ fiji =2 PLg is used.
2.5.2 Network and Allocation Value
All established and possible connections in a network structure define how valuable a network
is. This value is termed network value and can be calculated by a value function [21].
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Definition 2.14 (Network Value) The network value represents the worth of a network struc-
ture and can be calculated by a value function  : L ! R.
Value functions can have interesting properties. For instance a value function is component
additive if
P
c2CLE (c) = 
 LE. This property rules out externalities across components,
i.e. components do not interfere with each other [21].
Another interesting property is the anonymity. An anonymous value function assigns value
to a network LE based on its structure, independently of the labels of players involved in the
connections. For instance, let us consider a permutation of players  : P ! P (a bijection from
P to P). For any LE 2 L, LE; = ijjij 2 LE	. That is, LE; shares the same structure as
LE with players permuted. A value function  is anonymous if   LE; =   LE [21].
The network value is distributed among all players by means of an allocation rule.
Definition 2.15 (Allocation Rule) An allocation rule is a function, i
 LE;, that assigns a
value to each player i 2 P , such thatPi2P i  LE; =   LE ; 8LE 2 L.
Note that the allocation rule depends on the network structure, LE , and on the value function,
. This allows the allocation rule to calculate the role that every player has on the network,
considering the network structure and network value [21].
Allocation rules, similarly to value functions, can also be anonymous. An anonymous allo-
cation rule assigns values to players independently of their labels. Considering a permutation
of players  : P ! P and   LE; =   LE ;8LE 2 L, an allocation rule is anonymous if
for any LE 2 L and any permutation of players , i
 LE;; = i  LE;.
2.5.3 Formation Process
Value functions and allocation rules measure the outcome of networks and how that outcome
can be assigned to players. A method to actually establish connections is still needed and, in
the literature, many approaches have been proposed [21, 41]. One of such approaches uses
non-cooperative game theory. However, important aspects in network formation, such as the
order in which connections are established, are not taken into consideration by non-cooperative
games [29]. Another approach is to model the objective of network formation in terms of
stability and efficiency [42].
In a stable network, players have no incentive to add or remove connections. Many stability
definitions have been proposed [21, 42, 43]. One of the most common is the pairwise stability.
Definition 2.16 (Pairwise Stability) A network LE is pairwise stable with respect to  and 
if:
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1. for all ij 2 LE; i
 LE;  i  LE n fijg ; and j  LE;  j  LE n fijg ;,
and
2. for all ij =2 LE , if i
 LE [ fijg ; > i  LE; then j  LE [ fijg ; < j  LE;.
Condition 1 of this definition dictates that both players involved in a connection must agree on
maintaining it. As for condition 2, it dictates that if a connection does not exist in LE , then it
means that at least one of the players would not benefit from establishing that connection. It
is implicit in this definition that any player can unilaterally sever any of its connections and,
for a connection to be established, the consent of both players involved in the establishment is
needed.
The pairwise stability is simple and easy to work with [21]. However, it has one limitation.
The definition only checks for stability among pairs of players, ignoring more complex changes
that involve more than two players or more than one connection simultaneously. Strong stability
addresses such limitation by considering all possible combinations of connection establishments
or dissolutions [43]. Prior to define strong stability, the notion of deviation by a subgroup of
players needs to be introduced. A network LE0 2 L is obtainable from LE 2 L via deviations
by V  P if:
1. ij 2 LE0 and ij =2 LE implies that ffig [ fjgg  V , and
2. ij 2 LE and ij =2 LE0 implies that ffig [ fjgg \ V 6= ;.
The deviation by a subgroup V implies that the establishment of new connections is allowed
only within players in V . As for connection dissolutions, at least one of the players involved in
the dissolution of a connection must belong to V .
Definition 2.17 (Strong Stability) A network LE 2 L is strongly stable with respect to  and
 if for: i) any V  P , ii) any LE0 that is obtainable from LE via deviations by V , iii) and any
i 2 V such that i
 LE0 ; > i  LE;; then there exists j 2 V such that j  LE0 ; <
j
 LE;.
This strong stability notion is more refined than the pairwise stability. In fact, the set of strong
stable networks is a subset of pairwise stable networks [21,43]. The refinement comes from the
fact that strong stability checks for possible profitable deviations involving more than two play-
ers. Strong stability may be useful for small networks where there are only a few players with
established connections and efforts to improve the allocation value can be easily coordinated.
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For instance, in a wireless mesh network, with wireless routers establishing wireless connec-
tions between them, the strong stability would require all possible combinations of connection
establishments, or dissolutions, to be considered. In small networks with only a few wireless
routers, the number of combinations would not be too high and, hence, strong stability would
not be too demanding. However, in larger networks with many wireless routers, it would be very
demanding since too many possibilities of wireless connection establishments and dissolutions
exist [21].
Besides finding and improving the allocation values for every player, knowing which net-
work has the greatest network value may also be important. That is, which network brings the
greatest overall benefit, independently of the individual interests of every player. A network LE
is said to be efficient if it has the greatest possible network value.
Definition 2.18 (Efficient Network) A network LE is efficient, relative to , if   LE 

 LE0 for all LE0 2 L.
Note that there exists always at least one efficient network [21]. Having these definitions in
mind, different formation process methods are discussed next.
Dynamic Network Formation (DNF)
In this approach, introduced in [44], networks are dynamically formed over several iterations.
This process can be described as follows:
Step 1: The process begins with an empty network, LE = ;.
Step 2: At each iteration t = f1; 2; : : :g, a pair of players i and j is randomly chosen.
Step 3: If ij =2 LE , i.e. a connection between i and j does not exist, proceed to Step 3.1.
Otherwise, ij 2 LE , proceed to Step 3.2.
Step 3.1: If establishing the connection ij increases the allocation value of at least one of the
chosen players, without decreasing the allocation value of the other, then establish the
connection and proceed to Step 4. Otherwise, i.e. establishing the connection does not
increase allocation values, do nothing and proceed to Step 4.
Step 3.2: If severing ij increases the allocation value of at least one of the chosen players,
regardless of the other, then sever the connection and continue to Step 4. Otherwise, i.e.
severing the connection does not increase any of the allocation values, do nothing and
proceed to Step 4.
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Step 4: If all pairs of players have been chosen and no connections have been added or severed,
then end the process. Otherwise, go back to Step 2 for the next iteration.
With this method, either a pairwise stable network or a cycle of network modifications is reached
[21, 44]. A cycle is a sequence of networks
LE1 ;LE2 ; : : : ;LEK	, where LE1 = LEK and 8k =
f1; 2; : : : ; K   1g ;9i : i
 LEk ; < i  LEk+1;. That is, there always exists at least one
player that will have its allocation value increased by establishing or severing one connection.
Besides being stuck in a cycle, it is also possible to remain stuck at an empty network,
LE = ;. Such situation happens when establishing any connection does not lead to immediate
higher allocation values, even if future connection establishments, beyond the first one, will
give rise to allocation value improvements. This is related with the myopic behavior of players
when establishing or severing connections. Two different approaches can be used to overcome
such empty network. The first one is a stochastic approach, while the other tries to forecast
better future conditions that may lie behind less favorable networks [21, 45–48].
Stochastic Network Formation (SNF)
This process, similarly to DNF, starts from an empty network. Then, at each iteration t =
f1; 2; : : :g, a pair of players, i and j, is randomly chosen. Then, like in DNF, it is decided
whether or not the connection is established or severed. The difference from DNF is that the
decision on establishing a connection will only be carried with a probability of 1   , and the
reverse will happen with probability . Likewise, if it was decided that the connection should
be severed, then the decision will only be carried with probability 1   , and the reverse will
be done with probability . This way it is possible to get out of empty networks, where DNF
can get stuck. This process can continue on forever, since random perturbations are always
possible, and many pairwise stable networks can be visited. An examination can then be done
to understand which networks are more likely to be formed [21, 45].
Farsighted Network Formation (FNF)
As aforementioned, there is another alternative to DNF and SNF that tries to forecast better
future conditions that may lie behind less favorable immediate networks. This alternative is
termed farsighted network formation (FNF) and tries to overcome the myopic nature of the
decisions on establishing or severing connections. In large networks, players might have little
ability to guess how other players will react to the establishment or dissolution of a connection,
since many players and possible connections exist that have to be considered. However, in small
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networks, players may have good predictions about future moves and reachable networks. Many
approaches have been proposed to achieve this type of farsighted formation [21, 46–48]. For
instance, in [49] a method similar to repeated game theory is proposed, where future outcomes
are weighted by means of a discounting factor.
2.6 Summary
This chapter introduced essential topics on game theory that are used throughout this thesis. It
starts with one-stage games and how their outcome can be predicted. Afterwards, multi-stage
games are introduced, as well as their main differences from one-stage games. Besides multi-
stage games, where players play according to a specific order, repeated games are a good way
to model situations where all players interact repeatedly over many stages. In this case, special
emphasis is given to the Nash equilibrium of infinite-horizon repeated games, with which it is
possible to obtain equilibrium profiles where all players cooperate, leading to an overall better
outcome.
Network formation theory, which is a sub-field of game theory, is also introduced. This
approach is usually used to study the formation of social or economic networks, however, it can
also be applied to the establishment of wireless connections in a wireless mesh network.
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C H A P T E R 3
Fiber-Wireless Access Networks
3.1 Introduction
Bandwidth requirements of new services have been growing rapidly. To cope with such de-
mand, fiber is being deployed to provide Internet access to users in fiber to the home (FTTH)
or to the premises (FTTX) [1–3]. Fiber has several advantages over other technologies (e.g.
digital subscriber line (DSL)), such as the huge bandwidth capacity and long range communi-
cation without needing active devices for signal recovery. Moreover, it is a low maintenance
technology and, because of that, it is currently the medium of choice in most of today green-
field installations [1, 2]. However, fiber cannot go everywhere and users want Internet access
wherever they are. To provide this kind of ubiquity, wireless and cellular networks are the
technologies of choice. Despite the initial purpose of wireless technology, which is to pro-
vide low bandwidth and short distance communications, recent developments allowed wireless
technology to achieve higher bandwidths. The fact that fiber is the medium of choice for new
installations, being continuously preferred over other wired technologies, and the ubiquity re-
quired by users makes the joining of both these technologies a very interesting approach. FiWi
access networks join both technologies in order to provide the required high bandwidth of new
services and applications, while also providing the required ubiquity that users demand [13–16].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the enabling tech-
nologies of both wireless and optical environments and how they can be combined to build FiWi
access networks. In Section 3.3, network related notation and some assumptions, that are used
throughout the thesis, are presented and explained.
Contributions:
i) Survey on FiWi access networks through a careful explanation of all enabling technologies.
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Publications:
The work in this chapter is to be published in [23].
3.2 Enabling Technologies for FiWi Access Networks
3.2.1 Wireless Networks
Wireless communication technology has been evolving considerably. Data rates up to hundreds
of Mbps and ranges up to hundreds of meters are common nowadays [50–53]. Such improve-
ments were possible due to great advances at the physical, media access control (MAC) and
network layers. At the physical layer, the most common techniques used to improve data rate
and signal quality are the multi-input multi-output (MIMO) and the orthogonal frequency di-
vision multiplexing (OFDM) [51, 53]. MIMO uses multiple antennas at the transmitter and/or
receiver to improve spectral efficiency or link reliability. As for OFDM, it is used to encode
data on multiple orthogonal carrier frequencies, leading to a higher spectral efficiency. Both of
these techniques have been extensively used on many new wireless protocols, such as, 802.11n,
LTE and WiMAX [50,52, 54–58].
At the MAC layer, new time division multiple access (TDMA) schemes and dynamic band-
width allocation (DBA) schemes with QoS concerns have been proposed and released by new
wireless and cellular protocols. Providing the needed QoS for all types of traffic in wireless
and cellular networks is one of the most important challenges [59]. The same distribution net-
work needs to be able to accommodate all kinds of traffic, such as VoIP, video conferencing,
audio and video streaming, online gaming, virtual private networking (VPN), web browsing,
file transfers, etc. Both LTE and WiMAX provide mechanisms to identify all QoS parameters,
prioritize traffic and control data rates, delays and packet delay variations (PDV), according to
the needs of different types of traffic [57–60].
As for the network layer, cellular networks have been experiencing changes in network
structure. For instance, LTE has a flatter network structure with fewer nodes when compared
to previous cellular networks, such as universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS)
[58,61]. Due to this structural change, the new base stations of LTE are more complex and take
care of functionalities such as radio resource management and handoff procedures. This way,
LTE has a more distributed management, unlike previous cellular networks that use less capable
base stations and have a centralized management. Moreover, cellular networks are moving away
from circuit switched communications to all-IP packet networks, which eases the integration of
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different multimedia services in the same distribution network [51, 58, 61].
Still relating the network layer, considerable research efforts have been applied on wireless
mesh networks (WMNs). In such networks, wireless routers, connected wirelessly in a mesh
topology, can be scattered around an area to provide Internet access to users. This topology
can be easily used to provide great coverage, since wireless routers can be promptly deployed
where they are most needed and integrated with the rest of the wireless mesh. In addition,
due to its structure, mesh networks provide great flexibility in terms of resource provisioning
and survivability [62–64]. The 802.11s standard has already been released to support WMNs. It
introduces changes to 802.11 in terms of multihop routing, medium access and security [65–67].
The drawback of 802.11s is that it is not the most suited technology for high data rates and long
distance communications, when compared to LTE or WiMAX [50–54].
To further increase the capacity of WiMAX and LTE, and to cope with the requirements of
the International Mobile Telecommunications-Advanced (IMT-Advanced) specifications, also
termed as the fourth generation (4G), WiMAX 2.0 and LTE-Advanced were proposed [51, 53,
68–71]. These protocols introduce techniques to improve data rates up to 1 Gbps for nomadic
access and 100 Mbps for mobile users. Other aspects, such as mobility, latency and handover
were also significantly improved [58, 69, 72]. One of the techniques implemented by LTE-
Advanced and WiMAX 2.0 is the aggregation of non-contiguous carriers. This contributes to
a high impact on the achievable data rates since, in practice, greater bandwidth usage will be
possible. For instance, LTE-Advanced can use up to 100 MHz, while LTE only allows up
to 20 MHz [53, 73]. Concerning the network structure, LTE-Advanced and WiMAX 2.0 also
implement relay techniques to improve coverage and signal quality [69, 74–76].
3.2.2 Optical Access Networks
As aforementioned, new services and applications are becoming more and more demanding,
requiring higher data rates and stricter QoS parameters. Existing copper access networks, such
as DSL, can not cope with such demands. The optical fiber, on the other hand, seems to fit
perfectly, since it is an excellent transmission medium with great longevity, low attenuation and
high cost effectiveness. In fact, many optical access networks have already been deployed in
many countries [1–3].
In optical access networks, different configurations are possible according to how close the
fiber is to the users: FTTH, fiber to the building (FTTB) or fiber to the cabinet (FTTC). In FTTB
and FTTC, the final connections are made with copper technologies, such as DSL or Ethernet,
depending on how far fiber is from users [3,4]. These new optical access networks fulfill current
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requirements and open way for new demanding services, such as triple play, video on demand,
HDTV, online gaming, etc.
The most famous optical technology used at the access section is the PON. It consists of
deploying fiber from the CO to several optical network units (ONUs), near the users. At the
CO, fiber is connected to an optical line terminal (OLT) and up to 32 ONUs can be served by
the same OLT, depending on the specific PON protocol that is being used. If more ONUs need
to be served, then more OLTs need to be added at the CO. No active devices exist between
the ONUs and the OLT, hence the name passive optical network. The signal to/from the OLT
is joined/split by means of a passive splitter, meaning that all ONUs share the same optical
medium. The downstream transmission is broadcast to all ONUs and each ONU selects its own
traffic. In the upstream, transmissions are synchronized in a TDMA manner. The high data
rates and the inexistence of active components between the OLT and the ONUs contribute to
the high cost effectiveness and high energy efficiency of PONs [77–80].
Currently commercialized PONs use either the EPON or GPON protocol. EPON, as the
name suggests, aims at bringing the existing low cost Ethernet standard to the access net-
work. The advantage of EPON is that most traffic is generated and terminated at Ethernet
local networks, hence, translation among different data frame formats is not necessary. As for
the GPON, it is an evolution of the asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) technology. GPON has
the advantage of achieving higher data rates than EPON, 2.488 Gbps in downstream and 1.244
Gbps in upstream against the symmetrical 1.25 Gbps of EPON. Moreover, GPON is more scal-
able and flexible, since it allows up to 64 ONUs, whereas EPON allows up to 32 ONUs, and
different downstream and upstream asymmetrical data rates are possible [78, 79, 81–83].
Like any other technology, optical access networks continue to evolve in order to meet future
requirements. Next generation PONs have been widely researched and, currently, evolutions of
GPON and EPON are actively being specified by the International Telecommunications Union,
Telecommunication Standardization Sector, (ITU-T) and Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE), respectively. The evolution of GPON, 10G-PON (XG-PON), will be able to
operate at a symmetrical 10 Gbps or at an asymmetrical 10 Gbps in downstream and 2.5 Gbps
in upstream. The split ratio is also expected to be increased and several chained splitters will
also be possible, which will improve flexibility. Reach will also be improved through the use of
reach extenders [7, 9–12,84, 86, 89].
As for the 10 Gigabit EPON (10G-EPON), the evolution of EPON, it will operate sym-
metrically at 10 Gbps or asymmetrically at 10 Gbps in downstream and 1 Gbps in upstream.
Both XG-PON and 10G-EPON can coexist with their previous versions, GPON and EPON, re-
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spectively. XG-PON will use wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) to coexist with GPON,
while 10G-EPON will use dual-rate TDMA and WDM for coexistence to be possible. These
new generation PONs, due to their high capacities, may be used as common access infrastruc-
tures to support residential and business applications. Furthermore, they can also be used as a
backhaul for cellular or wireless networks [7, 9–12, 84, 86, 89].
Beyond XG-PON and 10G-EPON, other technologies can be exploited to further improve
PON capabilities. Dense wavelength division multiplexing PON (DWDM-PON) is one possible
approach. It will enable the transmission of many wavelengths in a limited spectrum region,
providing high bandwidth to many subscribers [87].
Long reach PON (LR-PON) is another PON technology that has also been receiving some
research effort. This will enable the reach of PONs to be increased from 20 km to 100 km
through the use of optical amplifiers. Moreover, this will also allow greater split ratios, meaning
that more ONUs can be served by the same OLT. As a result, this can lead to a lower number
of COs and, therefore, higher cost savings, since less COs and OLTs will be needed. XG-
PON, actually, specifies that longer reaches will be achieved through the use of reach extenders
[88, 89].
3.2.3 FiWi Topologies and Approaches Proposed in Literature
Optical access networks meet current and future service/application requirements. However,
users also want Internet access everywhere. FiWi access networks use both optical and wireless
technologies to take advantage of the optical high capacity and wireless ubiquity [13–15].
FiWi access networks are composed of two parts, termed back end and front end. At the
back end, optical links are brought from the CO toward end users and, at the front end, wireless
routers take over and provide Internet, as exhibited in Figure 3.1. The main optical technology
considered at the back end is the PON, due to its high deployment, high capacity and grow-
ing potential. At the front end, any radio frequency technology can be used, such as 802.11,
WiMAX or LTE [13–16].
Deploying different technologies at the back and front end may bring additional challenges,
since different protocols and architectures may be in use. For instance, in [90], a FiWi prototype
was developed, which consists of an EPON at the back end and 802.11g wireless routers at the
front end. Modifications at EPON and 802.11 protocols were not needed for the FiWi network
to function. However, performance could be significantly improved if a closer integration was
developed. For instance, the multi-point control protocol (MPCP) based DBA at the EPON and
the routing protocol at the wireless section were unaware of each other, leading to a loosely
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Figure 3.1: FiWi access network composition.
integrated architecture and control. The development of a closer integration was left for future
work.
Given the architectural and operational requirements of LTE, its integration in a FiWi ac-
cess network needs careful planning. More specifically, certain components of the LTE network
architecture, such as the mobile management entity, serving gateway and packet data network,
need to be integrated in the FiWi architecture [16, 58]. Furthermore, PONs are typically de-
ployed as tree topologies, which can not easily support a fully distributed mesh structure of
decentralized base stations, which is required by the LTE specification [58, 91]. In [16], the
integration between a wavelength division multiplexing PON (WDM-PON) and LTE is studied
and these integration issues, among others, are addressed.
Research on FiWi access networks can be mainly classified in three groups [16]: i) radio
over fiber (RoF) systems [17]; ii) hybrid optical/WMN access networks [15]; iii) specific in-
tegration of PONs and 802.11/WiMAX technologies [18, 19]. The first group, RoF, mainly
studies the transmission of radio signals directly through fiber. As a result, wireless protocol
management can be centralized at the CO and antenna units will simply radiate through air the
received signals from fiber, and send through fiber the signals received wirelessly. These an-
tenna units have low requirements in terms of circuitry, since resource management and signal
generation is centralized, and, as such, are more simple and more cost effective than regular
access points, wireless routers and base stations. Furthermore, antenna units can handle any
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wireless technology. The RoF contributions have been mainly focused on transmission charac-
teristics and modulation techniques, considering primarily physical layer issues [16, 17]. The
drawback of this approach is that sending radio signals over long fibers increases delays, which
can exceed certain timeouts of wireless MAC protocols [13, 92, 93]. In centralized polling and
scheduling systems, the delays can be taken into account by interleaved polling. However,
distributed MAC protocols may not work as expected [13].
The second group has mainly focused on FiWi access networks with a WMN at the front
end. Research efforts at this group have mainly focused on performance issues of the multihop
front end through the development of routing algorithms and optimal placement of ONUs and
gateways [15, 90, 94, 95]. These architectures are very flexible, scalable and can easily provide
the needed coverage [14, 15, 62]. In fact, due to their flexibility, some have already been de-
ployed as municipal access solutions to eliminate the need for wired connections [15]. In [90],
a prototype was developed, using an EPON at the back end and 802.11g wireless routers at the
front end, and a performance study was conducted. Several key aspects were identified that can
significantly improve performance, such as integrating the routing protocol used at the front
end with resource allocation of the back end, and using TDMA MAC protocols at the wireless
section instead of collision avoidance ones.
As for the third group, its contributions have been mainly focused on the integration between
PON and WiFi/WiMAX protocols. For instance, how can different classes of service, specified
by different protocols, be integrated. The challenge relies on merging both standards in use
at front and back end in the most scalable and seamless possible way. In [18], a module is
introduced between an ONU and a WiMAX base station to coordinate joint resource allocation.
3.3 Network Model and Nomenclature
This thesis will focus on FiWi access networks with a wireless mesh network at the front end.
These networks are considered to be the most promising due to their cost effectiveness, band-
width efficiency, wide coverage, high flexibility and scalability [14, 15, 62]. In such networks,
there are many issues to be solved in terms of routing schemes, energy efficiency and resource
provisioning, which will be addressed in this thesis [14].
The mesh front end of FiWi access networks is composed of gateways and wireless routers.
The gateways are responsible for the frontier between the optical and wireless environment and
for forwarding traffic to/from the optical link. Users willing to send/receive traffic to/from the
Internet, will connect to either a wireless router or a gateway. From here on, the term wireless
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node will be used when referring to either a wireless router or a gateway. As for the back end,
as aforementioned, the most common technology is the PON.
In these FiWi mesh architectures, traffic from users might need to traverse several wireless
routers in a multihop manner in order to reach its destination. Traffic that a wireless node
forwards from its directly connected users is termed local traffic throughout this thesis. Traffic
being forwarded, at a wireless node, that belongs to users connected to other wireless nodes is
termed foreign traffic.
To denote the set of nodes in a FiWi access network, the following notation will be used
throughout this thesis:
G: Set of gateways at the front end of the FiWi access network.
R: Set of wireless routers at the front end of the FiWi access network, gateways not in-
cluded.
W: Set of wireless nodes. This set includes both gateways and wireless routers,W = G[R.
O: Set of ONUs at the back end of the FiWi access network.
N : Set of nodes in the FiWi access network, N =W [O.
3.3.1 Independent Networks
Every wireless router in R needs to be associated with a gateway from G in order to provide
Internet access to its users. Since it is assumed that routers forward traffic to/from its associ-
ated gateway using a single upward/downward network connection, the wireless mesh will be
partitioned into jGj smaller networks with a tree structure, called independent networks in this
thesis. Figure 3.2 shows a FiWi access network taken from [95], the San Francisco Network
(SFNet), already with independent networks drawn according to a shortest path criterion that
also balances the number of routers per gateway in case of alternative shortest paths. Note that
the independent networks are a result of the routing protocol being used. If the routing protocol
changes routes according to network conditions, then the independent networks will change
accordingly. In this thesis, the gateway routers are always the root nodes of the independent
networks, i.e. ONUs are not part of the independent network. The only exception is in Chapter
6, where the ONUs are the roots of the independent networks.1
1In Chapter 6, the reader will be reminded of this difference and an explanation will be given for such distinc-
tion.
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Figure 3.2: FiWi access network, taken from [95], with independent networks drawn.
Throughout the thesis,  +i and  
 
i are used to represent the descendants and ancestors,
respectively, of a node i 2 N included in an independent network. For instance,  +i , for i 2 G,
will be the set of wireless routers associated with gateway i. To represent the set of children of
node i, i.e. the nodes immediately below i, +i is used, and to represent the parent node of i, i.e.
the node immediately above,  i is used. For instance, in the independent network of gateway 5
in Figure 3.2, nodes 1 and 3 make the set +2 , while 
 
2 denotes node 5. A specific independent
network can be identified by the wireless gateway that is serving all wireless routers included
in the independent network. That is, for a i 2 G, the set of all nodes in the independent network
served by gateway i can be represented by fig [  +i ; 8i 2 G.
A wireless node i 2 W will only forward local traffic (both downstream and upstream)
to/from the users directly connected to it, and foreign traffic to/from wireless nodes in  +i ,
according to the independent network structure. The downstream and upstream local traffic of
a wireless node i 2 W at time t is denoted by Bdi (t) and Bui (t), respectively. Note that these
are amount of bytes to be transmitted. To represent the byte rate of a wireless node i 2 W at
time t, that is required for downstream and upstream local traffic, di (t) and 
u
i (t) are used,
respectively. When needed, the joint amount of local downstream and upstream bytes to be
transmitted/received by i 2 W at time t is represented by Bi (t) throughout this thesis, Bi (t) =
Bdi (t)+B
u
i (t). Similarly, the joint byte rate required for downstream and upstream local traffic
of i 2 W at time t is represented by i (t) throughout this thesis, i (t) = di (t) + ui (t).
For an easier reference, the notation introduced is summarized as follows:
 +i : All descendants of a node i 2 N , considering an independent network in particular.
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  i : All ancestors of a node i 2 N , considering an independent network in particular.
+i : Set of children of a node i 2 N , i.e. the nodes immediately below i, considering an
independent network in particular.
 i : Parent node of node i 2 N , considering an independent network in particular.
capi: Highest attainable byte rate between node i 2 R and  i . For i 2 G, capi is the
attainable byte rate capacity of the optical link.
Bdi (t): Downstream local traffic (amount of bytes) destined to wireless node i at time t.
di (t): Byte rate required by downstream local traffic of wireless node i at time t.
Bui (t): Upstream local traffic (amount of bytes) sent by wireless node i at time t.
ui (t): Byte rate required by upstream local traffic of wireless node i at time t.
Bi (t): Downstream and upstream local traffic (amount of bytes) belonging to wireless node i
at time t, Bi (t) = Bdi (t) +B
u
i (t).
i (t): Byte rate required by downstream and upstream local traffic of wireless node i at time
t, i (t) = di (t) + 
u
i (t).
3.4 Summary
This chapter presents FiWi access networks. It starts by introducing the current state of the
art of wireless and optical networks. Currently used standards, as well as technologies under
heavy development and research, were presented along with their features and potential. FiWi
access networks were then introduced. Several possible approaches for the integration between
wireless and optical technologies, and their main challenges, were explained. In this thesis,
FiWi access networks with a mesh front end are the main focus of study. The chapter ends with
some notation definitions that will be used throughout all the next chapters.
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Traffic Forwarding Game
4.1 Introduction
In FiWi access networks, packets have to travel through several hops in order to reach the optical
link, in case of upstream traffic, or to reach the wireless router to which users are connected, in
case of downstream traffic. Hence, wireless routers have to forward local and foreign traffic for
communication to become possible. This chapter presents a repeated game to model bandwidth
sharing among selfish wireless routers that are mainly interested in forwarding traffic from their
own users. Subsequently, through Nash equilibrium, it can be verified under which conditions
will wireless routers cooperate. This model serves as an initial study to understand whether
or not cooperation is possible among wireless routers in FiWi access networks with a wireless
mesh front end.
There are already some contributions that apply game theory to WMNs [33, 96]. However,
the purpose of a traditional WMN is different from the purpose of a FiWi access front end. In
traditional WMNs, nodes inside the mesh can send traffic to each other and, consequently, all
nodes are potential sources, destinations and intermediaries. On the other hand, in FiWi access
networks, there is little or no interest in sending traffic to nodes inside the access network since
its main purpose is to provide Internet access. Therefore, it can be considered that most of its
traffic is sent/received to/from gateways connected to ONUs.
The next section presents the repeated game model along with the used notation. Section 4.3
explains how Nash equilibrium was calculated and discusses the obtained results. The chapter
ends with a brief summary in Section 4.5.
Contributions:
i) Showcase of a first application of game theoretical concepts to the problem of traffic for-
warding in a FiWi access network where wireless routers are selfish players interested only
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in forwarding their own local traffic.
ii) Development of a game theoretical model.
iii) Demonstrate existence of Nash equilibrium.
Publications:
The work in this chapter has been published in [24, 25].
4.2 Repeated Game Model
4.2.1 Bandwidth Sharing
In FiWi access networks with a mesh front end, as aforementioned in Section 3.2, the inter-
face with the user is made using a multi-hop wireless mesh network. As such, for Internet
communication to be possible, wireless routers have to forward both local and foreign traffic.1
In this chapter, it is assumed that routes at the mesh front end are already established by a
routing algorithm and independent networks with tree structures emerge from the established
routes as previously explained in Section 3.3.1. Also, the notation introduced in Section 3.3
will be used in this chapter to denote all node sets, such as routers, gateways and ONUs.
Every router i 2 R has a set of users connected to it that together receive Bdi (t) of down-
stream traffic and generate Bui (t) of upstream traffic, throughout time t. Wireless routers that
are not leafs in the tree structure, which i belongs to, +i 6= ;, have to forward foreign traffic
belonging to users connected to routers in  +i , besides their own local traffic. These wireless
routers, are termed forwarding routers and the set of all such routers is denoted by F . Note that
F  R. As for the leaf routers, they are termed non forwarding routers and forward only local
traffic.
Each forwarding router i 2 F , forwards traffic from foreign users according to a variable
called cooperation level, i (t) 2 [0; 1], that represents the fraction of foreign traffic that should
be forwarded. The value 0 and 1 represent full defection and full cooperation, respectively. A
forwarding router has the freedom to set its cooperation level and change it according to its
wishes throughout time t. As a result, and since forwarding routers are selfish players only
interested in forwarding their own local traffic, it is expected that they will set their cooperation
levels to 0. That is, forwarding routers will defect, unless they have some sort of incentive to
cooperate.
1See Section 3.3 for the definition of local and foreign traffic.
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The incentive that forwarding routers need to cooperate can be provided by assigning a
different objective to the gateways. Every gateway j 2 G wants to forward as much traffic as
possible from all wireless routers. Moreover, if some forwarding router does not cooperate,
then the gateway can apply a punishment by forwarding less traffic from the defecting router.
Every gateway j 2 G decides how much traffic to forward from each wireless router i 2  +j
through a cooperation level ji (t). The set of all cooperation levels of a gateway j is represented
by j (t). Similarly to cooperation levels of forwarding routers, each cooperation level of the
gateways can have any value in the interval [0; 1], where 0 means full defection and 1 means
full cooperation. Note that in this case, gateways would solely be responsible for the frontier
between front and back end, without accepting user connections. However, it is possible to
consider user connections by assuming that gateways are composed of two connected parts:
a regular non forwarding router, which accepts connections from users and forwards traffic
according to its own cooperation level, and a gateway, which is responsible for the frontier
between front and back end.
Forwarding routers and gateways are the only nodes that can make decisions in the game,
since they are the ones that can decide how much foreign traffic to forward. Hence, it can be
considered that forwarding routers and gateways are the only players in the game.
Before proceeding into the details of the model, the notation just introduced is resumed in
the following list:
F: Set of forwarding routers, i.e. F = i 2 R : +i 6= ;	.
i (t): Cooperation level of a forwarding router i 2 F throughout time t.
ji (t): Cooperation level of a gateway j 2 G applied to wireless router i throughout time t.
4.2.2 Stage Game
In this chapter, the time t being used does not refer to continuous time but rather to stages. Let us
consider the independent network of gateway 5 in Figure 4.1. Node 1 has Bd1 (t) of downstream
traffic destined to it. However, the gateway only forwards a fraction, 51 (t), of the traffic B
d
1 (t)
and router 2 only forwards a fraction, 2 (t), of the traffic Bd1 (t)
5
1 (t). So, router 1 receives
Bd1 (t)
5
1 (t) 2 (t) of downstream traffic. Generalizing, the received downstream traffic for any
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Figure 4.1: Independent networks created by the shortest paths calculation.
router i 2 R, associated with gateway j 2    i \ G, can be calculated using:2
Bdi (t) = B
d
i (t)
j
i (t)
Y
k2f  i nfjgg
k (t) : (4.1)
The same happens for upstream. Considering router 1, only Bu1 (t) 2 (t)
5
1 (t) of traffic from
router 1 arrives the optical section. To calculate the upstream traffic, for any router i 2 R
associated with gateway j 2    i \ G, the following expression can be used:
Bui (t) = B
u
i (t)
j
i (t)
Y
k2f  i nfjgg
k (t) : (4.2)
The total traffic (downstream and upstream), belonging to the users of a router i, successfully
received and transmitted, at stage t, will be:
Bi (t) = B
d
i (t) +B
u
i (t) ;8i 2 R: (4.3)
Forwarding routers will have to forward traffic besides their own, as already explained in
Section 4.2.1. Such foreign traffic, forwarded by a forwarding router i 2 F , can be calculated
2Note that
Q ; = 1.
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by:
B
 +i
(t) = i (t)
264X
k2 +i
0B@Buk (t) Y
m2f +i \  k g
m (t)
1CA +
+
X
k2 +i
0B@Bdk (t)jk (t) Y
m2f  i \ +j g
m (t)
1CA
375 ; j =    i \ G : (4.4)
Concerning the gateway, the forwarded foreign traffic can be calculated using the following
expression:
B
 +j
(t) =
X
i2 +j

Bdi (t)
j
i (t)

+
X
i2 +j
264Bui (t)ji (t) Y
k2( +j \  i )
k (t)
375 ;8j 2 G: (4.5)
To measure the interests of players, stage payoff functions are used. The stage payoff func-
tions for forwarding and gateway routers will not be the same due to their different objectives.
The stage payoff of forwarding routers is calculated by the sum of two functions. The first is a
gain function gi (Bi (t)) ;8i 2 F , dependent on the traffic successfully sent and received. The
second is a negative cost function ci

B
 +i
(t)

;8i 2 F , that depends on the traffic forwarded
to other routers. Thus, the stage payoff of a forwarding router will be given by the following
utility function:
ui (t) = gi (B

i (t)) + ci

B
 +i
(t)

;8i 2 F : (4.6)
Therefore, in order to have a high payoff, it is in the interest of the forwarding routers to forward
a low amount of foreign traffic, and send a high amount of local traffic.
For the gateway, whose objective is to forward as much traffic as possible, the stage payoff
is calculated using just a gain function gj

B
 +j
(t)

; 8j 2 G, that depends on the total amount
of foreign traffic the gateway forwards. Thus, the stage payoff of a gateway will be given by the
following utility function:
uj (t) = gj

B
 +j
(t)

; 8j 2 G: (4.7)
Note that gateways have a higher payoff if they forward more traffic. Therefore, it is in the
interest of the gateway that forwarding routers forward a high amount of traffic.
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4.2.3 Repeated Game
A repeated game consists in a number of repetitions of some stage game, as already explained in
Section 2.4. In every stage, players decide which actions to take based on the stage payoff they
get. A player can decide not to cooperate with the opponents, earning a higher immediate pay-
off. However, that action can cause losses to other players in the game, and these other players
can, in future stages, punish that player. Therefore, in a repeated game, players have to worry
about present and future stage payoffs when deciding which action to take. A forwarding router
might choose to defect in order to have a higher immediate payoff, however, the gateway can
punish the defecting forwarding router in future stages, leading to lower future stage payoffs.
The discounted payoff function can help players to know if some action will lead to higher or
lower future payoffs:
Uk = (1  )
1X
t=0
tuk (t) ; 8k 2 (F [ G) ; (4.8)
where  is the discounting factor, already introduced in Section 2.4.2. Note that, high values of
 characterize players more concerned with future payoffs, whereas low values of  characterize
players interested in the payoff of the current stage.
In each stage t, players have to choose their cooperation levels based on their strategies. In
this case, the strategy adopted by a player outputs the cooperation level to use in every stage t.
For the forwarding routers, the strategy, si (:), depends on the downstream and upstream traffic
perceived in the previous stage, Bi (t  1) ; 8i 2 F . Thus:
i (t) = si (B

i (t  1)) : (4.9)
For the gateways, the strategy depends on the cooperation levels of the forwarding routers
in the previous stage, i (t  1) ; 8i 2  +j ;8j 2 G. The gateways treat non forwarding routers
as always cooperating forwarding routers. Thus, 8j 2 G and 8i 2  +j :
ji (t) = sj (j (t  1)) : (4.10)
Whenever a forwarding router defects, the gateway will be able to punish it by decreasing
the respective cooperation level. This conflict of interests, where forwarding routers are mainly
interested in forwarding their local traffic and gateways are mainly interested in forwarding as
much traffic as possible from all wireless routers, is responsible for the balance of the game.
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4.3 Simulation
4.3.1 Simulation Setup
Simulations were done for SFNet in Figure 4.1. We consider that nodes receive three times
more traffic than they send, since downstream traffic in access networks is usually higher [97].
The gain and cost functions, used in (4.6), are shown to be dependent onBi (t) andB

 +i
(t) ;
8i 2 F , respectively. For simplicity, the gain is assumed to be the amount of traffic successfully
sent and received, Bi (t), while the cost is the symmetric of the amount of forwarded traffic,
B
 +i
(t). As such, the stage payoff of forwarding routers in the simulations is:
u0i (t) = B

i (t) +
h
 B
 +i
(t)
i
;8i 2 F : (4.11)
Depending on the objective of the simulation, other possibilities exist, e.g. a gain and cost
function that mimics signal interference or fading as in [32]. The same was considered for
the gateway, i.e. the payoff is considered to be the actual amount of traffic that the gateway
forwards:
u0j (t) = B

 +j
(t) ; 8j 2 G: (4.12)
To study equilibrium in a FiWi access mesh network, the following known strategies were
used [34, 38]:
Tit-For-Tat (TFT): The player mimics the previous action of the opponent. The first action is
to cooperate.
Anti-Tit-For-Tat (ATFT): The player mimics the previous action of the opponent. The first
action is not to cooperate.
Grim Trigger (GT): The player cooperates by default. If an opponent does not cooperate, then
the player will punish the opponent forever.
Always Cooperate (Al-C): Whatever the opponent does, the player always cooperates.
Always Defect (Al-D): Whatever the opponent does, the player never cooperates.
These strategies rely on two possible actions: cooperation and non-cooperation [34, 38]. How-
ever, the cooperation levels in our game can have any value in the interval [0; 1]. In order to
make these strategies compatible with the developed model, forwarding routers are set with a
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low cooperation level, 0:1, when defecting and are set with a high cooperation level, 0:8, when
cooperating.
Special attention is needed with the cooperation levels of the gateways. Let us consider the
independent network from gateway 5 in Figure 4.1. If gateway 5 sets all its cooperation levels
to 1, then it will not be able to punish a defecting router without hurting itself. For instance, if
router 2 from Figure 4.1 defects, then gateway 5 can punish router 2. However, by punishing
router 2, the gateway will forward less traffic and, as a result, gateway 5 receives a lower payoff.
That is, the threat from gateway 5 toward router 2 is an empty threat. To avoid this, gateway 5
can set its cooperation levels to lower values, instead of setting them to 1, when cooperating.3
This way, if router 2 defects, then gateway 5 can punish it by lowering the respective cooperation
level and increase the cooperation levels of routers 6 and 9 to compensate for the smaller amount
of traffic that the gateway will forward from router 2.
4.3.2 Analysis of Results
Table 4.1 shows the strategy profiles in equilibrium considering the cooperation levels of 0.1
and 0.8 for defecting and cooperating, respectively, along with the necessary  intervals for each
player. Nash equilibrium was tested by checking if any of the forwarding routers or gateways
would receive a greater payoff by deviating from the strategy, similar to what was exemplified
in Section 2.4.2. Note that in the independent network of gateway 16, the gateway can make
a deviation against router 12 or router 8. In Table 4.1, only the  intervals for the deviation
against router 8 are presented since these  intervals were smaller and more limitative than the
 intervals for the deviation against 12.
Notice that the equilibrium strategies are the same for independent networks of gateways
5, 14 and 22. This happens because these networks have a similar structure: one gateway, one
forwarding router directly connected to the gateway and some non forwarding routers. For the
independent network of gateway 16, the set of equilibrium strategy profiles is different because
of its different structure, both in terms of number of forwarding routers and their position in
relation to the gateway, as shown in Figure 4.1.
The  intervals for which the strategy profiles are in equilibrium are very large in the inde-
pendent networks of gateways 5, 13 and 22. Almost all profiles in Table 4.1 can have any value
for , except strategy profile (Al-C, GT). That makes sense because (Al-C, GT) requires the
forwarding router to always cooperate no matter what happens in the game, making the devia-
3The actual values could change for different independent networks, according to the number of forwarding
and non forwarding routers.
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Table 4.1: Strategy profiles in equilibrium.
strategy profiles  interval for equilibrium
In
de
pe
nd
en
tn
et
w
or
k
of
ga
te
w
ay
16
node 8 node 12 node 16
node 8 node 12 node 16
strategy strategy strategy
TFT ATFT TFT 0:69 - 1 0 - 1 0:70 - 1
ATFT ATFT TFT 0 - 0:69 0 - 1 0:48 - 1
GT ATFT TFT 0:69 - 1 0 - 1 0:58 - 1
ATFT ATFT GT 0 - 1 0 - 1 0:48 - 1
ATFT ATFT Al-C 0 - 1 0 - 1 0:76 - 1
ATFT Al-C GT 0 - 1 0 - 1 0 - 1
Al-D Al-C GT 0 - 1 0:57 - 1 0 - 1
In
de
pe
nd
en
tn
et
w
or
k
of
ga
te
w
ay
5
node 2 node 5
node 2 node 5
strategy strategy
ATFT TFT 0 - 1 0 - 1
ATFT GT 0 - 1 0 - 1
ATFT All-C 0 - 1 0 - 1
Al-C GT 0:72 - 1 0 - 1
Al-D TFT 0 - 1 0 - 1
Al-D GT 0 - 1 0 - 1
Al-D Al-C 0 - 1 0 - 1
In
de
pe
nd
en
tn
et
w
or
k
of
ga
te
w
ay
13
node 10 node 13
node 10 node 13
strategy strategy
ATFT TFT 0 - 1 0 - 1
ATFT GT 0 - 1 0 - 1
ATFT All-C 0 - 1 0 - 1
Al-C GT 0:55 - 1 0 - 1
Al-D TFT 0 - 1 0 - 1
Al-D GT 0 - 1 0 - 1
Al-D Al-C 0 - 1 0 - 1
In
de
pe
nd
en
tn
et
w
or
k
of
ga
te
w
ay
22
node 14 node 22
node 14 node 22
strategy strategy
ATFT TFT 0 - 1 0 - 1
ATFT GT 0 - 1 0 - 1
ATFT All-C 0 - 1 0 - 1
Al-C GT 0:59 - 1 0 - 1
Al-D TFT 0 - 1 0 - 1
Al-D GT 0 - 1 0 - 1
Al-D Al-C 0 - 1 0 - 1
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tion more appealing. This means that there are less possible values for  to achieve equilibrium.
Also, when using (Al-C, GT), the  interval required for equilibrium is smaller for forwarding
router 2, which belongs to the independent network of gateway 5, than for forwarding routers
10 and 14. This is due to the fact that more non forwarding routers depend on node 2, than on
nodes 10 or 14. Still for the same strategy profile, (Al-C, GT), the forwarding router 14, from
the network of gateway 22, also has a slightly smaller  interval, when comparing it with for-
warding router 10, of independent network with gateway 13, due to the higher number of non
forwarding routers dependent on the gateway in that network, as shown in Figure 4.1. Hence,
having more non forwarding routers dependent on forwarding routers or gateways impacts neg-
atively the equilibrium, i.e. shortens the  interval for which equilibrium is still possible.
In what concerns to the use of specific strategies by certain players, it can be seen that
ATFT and Al-D are never used by any of the gateways in a Nash equilibrium profile. The sole
objective of gateways is to forward as much traffic as possible from all wireless routers. Hence,
the gateway is interested in cooperating, unless it is punishing some forwarding router. When a
gateway uses ATFT, for instance, its first action is not to cooperate, resulting in lower payoffs,
independently of the strategies of the forwarding routers.
Results presented in Table 4.1 were obtained using cooperation levels of 0.1 and 0.8 for
defecting and cooperating, respectively. However, changing the cooperation level values may
change the  intervals and can even turn the equilibrium of a strategy profile into non equilib-
rium. Considering the strategy profile (Al-C, GT) in the independent networks of gateways 5,
13 and 22, Figure 4.2(a) and Figure 4.2(b) show the increase of the lower margin of the  in-
terval when the defecting and cooperating cooperation levels increase, respectively. Increasing
either the cooperating or the defecting cooperation level leads into a narrower  interval. This
makes sense since higher cooperation levels force forwarding routers to forward more traffic,
as can be inferred from expression (4.4).
In Figure 4.2(c), it is shown that changing cooperation levels can even turn a strategy profile
into non-equilibrium. It shows what happens to the lower margin of the  interval of gateway
16, with strategy profile (TFT, ATFT, TFT), when the cooperation level is too low for the
cooperating action. When it is lower than approximately 0:7, the lower margin of the  interval
becomes higher than 1 and, as explained in Section 2.4.2,  can only have values between 0
and 1. Notice that, contrarily to the forwarding routers, high cooperating and defecting levels
in gateways lead to larger  intervals, since their main objective is to forward traffic.
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Figure 4.2: Impact on  interval when: (a) defecting level of forwarding routers is increased and the
strategy profile (Al-C, GT) is used; (b) cooperation level of the forwarding routers is increased and the
strategy profile (Al-C, GT) is used; (c) when cooperation level of gateway 16 is increased and the strategy
profile (TFT, ATFT, TFT) is used.
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4.4 Conclusions
According to the analysis, it can therefore be stated that it is possible to design a game theoret-
ical model of traffic forwarding in FiWi access networks, in which Nash equilibrium exists for
a scenario where wireless routers have incentives to cooperate. This happens despite the selfish
nature of wireless routers, which are only interested in forwarding their own local traffic. For
the equilibrium to exist, some conditions have to be fulfilled. More specifically, gateways need
to have the purpose of forwarding as much traffic as possible from all wireless routers. This
way, gateways are able to control and punish wireless routers that do not cooperate. Without
such gateways, wireless routers at deeper positions in the independent network structure would
not have any traffic successfully delivered. Another important condition, for Nash equilibrium
to be possible, is the discounting factor. It is shown that as long as the discounting factor is high
enough, Nash equilibrium profiles where all routers cooperate is possible.
4.5 Summary
This chapter presents a first showcase of the application of game theoretical concepts to the
problem of traffic forwarding at the front end section of FiWi access networks. A repeated game
model is presented where wireless routers and gateways are players with opposing objectives.
Wireless routers are selfish players interested mainly in forwarding traffic from their directly
connected users, while gateways are interested in forwarding as much traffic as possible from/to
all wireless routers. Equilibrium profiles are then derived for the presented model, showing
that equilibrium in such networks is possible, provided that certain conditions exist. More
precisely, the gateway needs to have a different role, which is to forward as much traffic as
possible from all wireless routers and to punish any defecting forwarding routers. Without
such gateways, forwarding routers would not have any incentive to cooperate. It is also shown
that the discounting factor, , has to be within a certain interval. Such interval depends on the
number of non forwarding routers, which traffic has to be forwarded by forwarding routers and
gateway.
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Fair Bandwidth Allocation Algorithm
5.1 Introduction
Wireless routers at the wireless mesh section of FiWi access networks have to forward both
local and foreign traffic. In the previous chapter, it was studied whether or not cooperation is
possible in FiWi access networks where wireless routers are mainly interested in forwarding
local traffic. In this chapter, a different approach is pursued. It is assumed that wireless routers
want their resources to be as productive as possible. That is, every wireless router wants to
forward as much traffic as possible, either local or foreign, with as few packet drops as possi-
ble. Reducing the number of packet drops is important since packets being dropped may have
traveled through one or more hops and consumed bandwidth without being successfully deliv-
ered. Besides bandwidth consumption, the dropped packets may also consume processing time
and impose queuing delay to other packets. The conflict between routers arises when a cer-
tain traffic congestion level is reached and the available bandwidth is not enough to forward all
the traffic. In that case, players with more resource requirements may become too greedy and
capture all the available bandwidth, leading to starvation of routers with less bandwidth needs.
In this chapter, besides building a repeated game model, a bandwidth allocation algorithm is
also developed, which provides fairness among all wireless and gateway routers in FiWi access
networks.
This chapter starts by outlining a generic game theoretical model, where players, actions and
stage payoff functions are defined. Afterwards, in Section 5.3, conditions for Nash equilibrium
to exist are presented and an algorithm to achieve that equilibrium is proposed. Simulation and
results are then presented and discussed in Section 5.4. The chapter finalizes with a summary.
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Figure 5.1: FiWi access network from Figure 3.2, reproduced here for convenience.
Contributions:
i) Development of a game theoretical model that can serve as a framework for the development
of a bandwidth allocation algorithm.
ii) Development of a fair bandwidth allocation algorithm.
Publications:
The work in this chapter has been published in [26].
5.2 Game Theoretical Model
In this chapter, similarly to the previous one, it is assumed that routes have been established
by routing protocols. As a result, independent networks with a tree structure emerge from the
established routes, as explained in Section 3.3.1. The notation introduced in Section 3.3 will be
used to denote any set of nodes in the FiWi access network.
5.2.1 Players and Actions
The model developed in this chapter is inspired on repeated game theory [29, 38]. It consists
of successive stage game repetitions over a discrete time t. Throughout this chapter the term
stage is used when referring to a time slot. The players in this model are all the wireless
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nodes in W and their objective is to forward as much traffic as possible, which can be local
or foreign traffic.1 Reducing the number of packet drops will also be part of the objective
of every player, as packets being dropped may have traveled through one or more hops and
consumed bandwidth without being successfully delivered. There will be an independent game
per independent network, meaning that several games will be played in parallel. The discussion
that follows applies to each independent network.
At all stages, every player has to choose a value for a variable called sharing level, i
 +i
;8i 2
W .2 The sharing level can assume any real value between 0 and 1, and it represents the frac-
tion of bandwidth reserved in i for foreign traffic, which is traffic belonging to routers in  +i .
Besides choosing a sharing level for foreign traffic, players also choose how much of it will be
assigned to each player in +i and players in  
+
i n +i ; 8i 2 W . In Figure 5.2, such sharing level
assignment is illustrated for gateway 5 from Figure 5.1, where i
 +i
, 1   i
 +i
, i
j[ +j
, ij , 
i
 +j
denote:
i
 +i
: Bandwidth fraction at wireless node i reserved for foreign traffic.
1  i
 +i
: Bandwidth fraction at wireless node i reserved for local traffic.
i
j[ +j
: Bandwidth fraction at wireless node i reserved for local and foreign traffic of node
j; 8j 2 +i .
ij: Bandwidth fraction at wireless node i reserved for local traffic of node j; 8j 2 +i .
i
 +j
: Bandwidth fraction at wireless node i reserved for foreign traffic of node j; 8j 2 +i .
This value is split proportionally among all players in  +j . In the example of Figure 5.2,
5
 +2
is split between players 1 and 3 according to the amount of upstream and downstream
traffic of these players.
Clearly, i
j[ +j
= ij + 
i
 +j
; 8j 2 +i ;8i 2 W , and i +i =
P
j2+i
h
i
j[ +j
i
;8i 2 W . Leaf
nodes, such as nodes 1, 3 and 6 from the independent network of gateway 5 in Figure 5.1, for
example, have i
 +i
= 0, since no foreign traffic exists.
According to the estimated future bandwidth needs of players in  +i , player i 2 W will use
the sharing levels, shown above, to divide its bandwidth capacity, capi, among  
+
i and itself.
However, i is still vulnerable to its opponents in the following situations: i) wireless nodes in
1See Section 3.3 for definitions of local and foreign traffic.
2Not to be confused with the cooperation level from Chapter 4. Cooperation levels define the fraction of foreign
traffic to be forwarded, while the sharing levels, introduced in this chapter, define the fraction of the bandwidth
that is dedicated to foreign traffic.
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Figure 5.2: Sharing levels used by gateway router 5 from Figure 5.1.
  i may have sharing levels that are too small, resulting in packets being dropped further along
the path and, therefore, waste of resources at i; ii) wireless nodes in  +i may actually need less
bandwidth than what was reserved at i, resulting in unused bandwidth that could be used for
local traffic instead; iii) traffic from nodes in  +i , arriving at wireless node i, may be more than
the bandwidth reserved at i for foreign traffic, leading to the drop of packets and, therefore,
waste of resources. In summary, the opponents of i may be unpredictable or not trustworthy.
To protect themselves from traffic fluctuations of users connected to them, and from the
unknown actions of their opponents, every player i 2 W chooses a set of variables that reveal
the confidence that i has on its users and on its opponents, termed trust levels. These follow a
nomenclature similar to the one used by the sharing levels:
i: Trust level that i has on the fact that it will not receive excessive local traffic from its
users, or that sharing levels applied by wireless nodes in   i to its local traffic will not be
too small.
 ij: Trust level that i has on the fact that j will not receive excessive local traffic from its
directly connected users, or that sharing levels applied by wireless nodes in   i to the
local traffic of j will not be too small, 8j 2 +i .
 i
 +j
: Trust level that i has on the fact that j will not receive excessive foreign traffic, or that
sharing levels applied by wireless nodes in   i to foreign traffic of j will not be too small,
8j 2 +i .
In other words, i,  ij and  
i
 +j
represent the confidence that player i has on the fact that it
will not receive excessive traffic, or that wireless nodes in   i will not use small sharing levels,
which would cause packet drops. All trust levels assume a real value between 0 and 1, where 1
means full trust and 0 means full mistrust.
Whenever a player i 2 W , at some stage t, suspects that its directly connected users will
generate too much traffic, then it may protect itself by lowering i. This means that player i, at
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some stage t, will only be worried with providing the following bitrate to its connected users:
i (t) = 
i
 
di (t) + 
u
i (t)

; (5.1)
where di (t) and 
u
i (t) represent the downstream and upstream byte rates required by users
connected to node i 2 W at stage t. Analogously, if player i believes there will be too much
traffic belonging to users connected to players in  +i , then player i can lower the corresponding
trust levels,  ij or  
i
 +j
. This would mean that player i, at some stage t, is only worried with
providing the following bitrate for foreign traffic:

 +i
(t) =
X
j2+i

 ij

j (t) +  
i
 +j

 +j
(t)

: (5.2)
In practice, whenever trust levels are lowered, the responsibility for excessive traffic and packet
drops is being discarded to the sources. The exact amount of traffic that successfully reaches
its destination will depend on trust and sharing levels of all players in the independent network
and will be explained in Section 5.2.2.
At every stage, a player will choose an action based on the beliefs that it has on the behavior
of the opponents. In our case, every player i 2 W chooses trust and sharing levels based on
the expected traffic from users connected to i and on the expected traffic from users connected
to players in  +i . More specifically, player i chooses sharing levels to divide capi among the
expected local and foreign traffic and adjusts the trust levels according to its beliefs.
5.2.2 Stage Payoff
At all stages, every player receives a stage payoff that depends on the traffic delivered with
success. To explain how the successfully delivered traffic can be calculated, let us assume the
independent network of gateway 5 from Figure 5.1. The local traffic successfully sent and
received by gateway 5 depends on the available bandwidth for its local traffic, i.e. it depends on
its bandwidth capacity, cap5, its sharing level,

1  5
 +5

, and the trust level applied to its users,
i, as follows: on one hand, the bandwidth available for local traffic, that depends on the sharing
level and capacity, can not be exceeded, which means that in high load scenarios no more than
cap5

1  5
 +5

can be used for local traffic; on the other hand, if there is not much local traffic
to forward, or the trust level is a restraining factor, then no more than 5 (t) can be used for local
traffic delivery. Hence, we can state that gateway 5 will havemin

cap5

1  i
 +i

; i (t)

of
bandwidth for local traffic. Let us now assume wireless router 4, in the independent network of
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gateway 16 from Figure 5.1, whose traffic must cross several hops to reach the optical link. In
this case, the available bandwidth for the local traffic of node 4 will depend on the sharing and
trust levels of players in set   4 , which will be:
min
 
4 (t) ; cap4

1  4
 +4

; cap8
8
4;  
8
4

4 (t) ; cap12
12
 +8
4 (t) 
8
4 
12
 +8
4 (t) 
8
4 
12
 +8
; 4 (t) 
8
4 
12
 +8
;
cap16
16
 +12
4 (t) 
8
4 
12
 +8
 16
 +12
4 (t) 
8
4 
12
 +8
 16
 +12
+ 8 (t) 
12
8  
16
 +12
; 4 (t) 
8
4 
12
 +8
 16
 +12
!
:
Note that the amount of traffic from players 4 and 8 to be forwarded by player 16 will be
in proportion to their needs, 4 (t) 
8
4 
12
 +8
 16
 +12
+ 8 (t) 
12
8  
16
 +12
. Generalizing, the available
bandwidth to wireless node i over time t can be obtained by3:
Ai (t) = min
24i (t) ; capi 1  i +i  ; cap i  ii ;   ii i (t) ; minj2  
 
i
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j
 +
+
j
\  
i
i (t) 
 i
i
Q
l2j[

 +j \   
i
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 +
+
l
\  
iP
k2 +
+
j
\  
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k
Q
l2j[

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 
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1CCCCCA ;
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 i
i
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l2j[

 +j \   
i
 l ++
l
\  
i
37775 ;8i 2 W : (5.3)
Concerning the foreign traffic, of some wireless node i, being successfully delivered, this
also depends on the sharing and trust levels of players. For instance, player 2, in the independent
network of gateway 5 from Figure 5.1, forwards traffic from players 1 and 3, whose successful
traffic delivery depends on the bandwidth that they have available, A1 (t) and 
A
3 (t), respec-
tively. Hence, the bandwidth actually available to the foreign traffic of player i, over time t, is
given by:
A
 +i
(t) =
X
j2 +i
Aj (t) ; 8i 2 W : (5.4)
As already stated, the objective of all players is to forward as much traffic as possible while
3Note that min (;) = +1. We defined cap; = +1.
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avoiding packet drops. Hence, both expressions (5.3) and (5.4) can be used to calculate the
stage payoff, that a player i gets at every stage, as follows:
ui (t) =
(
i (t) + 
A
i (t) 
A
 +i
(t) ; +i 6= ;
i (t) + 
A
i (t) ; 
+
i = ;
;8i 2 W ; (5.5)
where i (t) represents the resources that were wasted due to packet drops, termed drop compo-
nent. This value is zero if no drops exist and negative if drops occur. The following expression
is used to calculate i (t):
i (t) =
8>><>>:
log

Ai (t)
i (t)

+ log
 
A
 +
i
(t)

 +
i
(t)
!
; +i 6= ;
log

Ai (t)
i (t)

; +i = ;
;8i 2 W : (5.6)
Note that, due to its logarithmic nature, a small amount of packet drops will only slightly reduce
the stage payoff, while high amounts of packet drops can greatly reduce the stage payoff. From
a network perspective, a small amount of packet drops can be tolerated while a high amount
of drops can be unbearable and greatly affect the services being provided by the FiWi access
network.
5.2.3 Strategies and Repeated Game
In a repeated game, players have to choose their actions at every stage according to their strate-
gies. The strategy of a player i 2 W is a function that depends on the history of previous
actions, si (ht), where ht is the set of all action profiles taken by all players prior to stage t.
In our case, each player of an independent network will have a strategy toward its opponents,
the other nodes of the independent network. Note that each independent network is a separate
game, as already introduced in Section 5.2.1. Such strategy outputs the sharing and trust levels
to be used at every stage, which will be based on the sharing and trust levels used by all players
at previous stages. Expressions (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5) vary over time and depend on the sharing
and trust levels chosen by all players. Since the strategy profile4 outputs the sharing and trust
levels to use at every stage t, we can write the previous expressions, from now on, as being
dependent on the strategy profile in use, Ai (s (ht)) ; 
A
 +i
(s (ht)) ; ui (s (ht)) ; 8i 2 W .
Throughout stages, players receive a stream of payoffs, ui (s (h0)) ; ui (s (h1)) ; ui (s (h2)) ;
4As introduced in Section 2.2.1, the tuple of strategies being used by all players in the game is called strategy
profile.
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: : : ; 8i 2 W , which can be used to calculate the average discounted payoff:
Ui (s) = (1  )
1X
t=0
tui (s (ht)) ;8i 2 W ; (5.7)
where 0 <  < 1 is the discounting factor already introduced in Section 2.4.2.
5.3 Equilibrium
5.3.1 Nash Equilibrium
A set of strategies and corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium if no player benefits
by deviating from its strategy while others keep their strategies unchanged, as aforementioned
in Section 2.4.2:
Ui
 
si ; s

 i
  Ui  si; s i ; 8si 2 Si;8i 2 W ; (5.8)
where s is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile. Nash equilibria in stage games are generically
inefficient and exhibit suboptimal results, as exemplified in Section 2.2.3. That is because
players can not know beforehand what will be the actions of their opponents and will, therefore,
play safe. In the game presented in this chapter, players do not know what will be the sharing
and trust levels of their opponents. Because of that, nodes will play safe by choosing low values
for their trust levels. This way they can be sure that their stage payoff, ui (t), will not be negative
due to high packet drops.
In the repeated game version, which is our case, Nash equilibrium greatly depends on the
discount factor, , from the average discounted payoff function (5.7). The parameter  repre-
sents how much a player is concerned with future or immediate payoffs, where the immediate
payoff is the payoff obtained for the current stage, t = 0, and future payoffs are the sequence of
payoffs obtained for future stages, t = 1; 2; :::. Players with a value of  near 1 are more con-
cerned with future payoffs, whereas players with  near 0 are more concerned with immediate
payoffs. If the player is more concerned with the immediate payoff, then the game is identical
to a one-stage game and the player will play safe in order not to receive payoffs below zero.
On the other hand, if future payoffs are important, the player may take the risk to get smaller
immediate payoffs in order to receive higher payoffs in the long run. As a result, efficient pay-
offs that cannot be reached by a Nash equilibrium in a stage game, might be reached in the
corresponding repeated game version. This is similar to the Nash equilibrium of the repeated
forwarder’s dilemma example in Section 2.4.2.
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For the problem studied in this chapter, we are interested in values of  near 1, since this
will lead to an outcome where routers forward as much traffic as possible and the successfully
delivered traffic is the highest possible5. Such situation happens whenever Ai (t) = 

i (t),
A
 +i
(t) = 
 +i
(t) and i =  ij =  
i
 +j
= 1, for all i 2 W . That is, when all traffic reaches
the destination and all trust levels are set to the highest value. According to (5.3), this can be
achieved when the following conditions are met:
i (t) = 
d
i (t) + 
u
i (t) ;8i 2 W (5.9)
i (t)  capi

1  i
 +i

; 8i 2 W (5.10)
i (t)  cap i 
 i
i ; 8i 2 W (5.11)
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! ;8i 2 W ; 8j 2   
 i
; (5.12)
where i
 +i
=
P
j2+i

ij + 
i
 +j

. These conditions can be further simplified into:
di (t) + 
u
i (t)
capi
 1  i
 +i
;8i 2 W (5.13)
di (t) + 
u
i (t)
cap i
  ii ;8i 2 W (5.14)

 +
+
j
\  
i
(t)
capj
 j
 +
+
j
\  
i
;8i 2 W ;8j 2   
 i
; (5.15)
where:

 +
+
j
\  
i
(t) =
X
k2 +
+
j
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i
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 +j \   
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=
X
k2 +
+
j
\  
i
 
dk (t) + 
u
k (t)

:
5The objective is to develop a bandwidth allocation algorithm, hence, the calculation of the exact values for
sharing levels, trust levels and  for which Nash equilibrium exists is out of the scope of this chapter.
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These conditions reveal that the sharing levels will be conditioned by traffic over capacity ratios
and will serve as a basis for the strategy discussed next.
5.3.2 Plain Strategy and Proposed Algorithm
Plain strategy works like a recipe for constructing equilibrium in repeated games. They consist
of a prescribed stream of cooperating action profiles, aPR, and a punishment action profile,
ai =

ai1; a
i
2; : : : ; a
i
jPj

, to be applied by all opponents of i when punishing i, 8i 2 W . As long
as no player deviates from the prescribed stream, the action profile at every stage t is aPR. A
player i may want to deviate from the prescribed stream by defecting at some stage t in order
to increase its payoff, causing smaller payoffs to all the others. When that happens, all players,
except i, respond by switching to the punishment action profile ai at the next stage. This strategy
is in equilibrium as long as the punishment is severe enough, deterring any deviation [38].
The algorithm proposed in this chapter adopts such plain strategy behavior. Players will
cooperate by choosing appropriate sharing levels in accordance to conditions (5.13), (5.14)
and (5.15) and high values for trust levels. Whenever, a player i 2 W detects that its drop
component, i (t), falls bellow a drop component threshold6, thi , then either 

i (t) or 

 +i
(t) is
too high and must be reduced by adjusting the respective trust level until i  thi . If i (t) is
the one that is too high, then i will have to reduce the trust level for the directly connected users,
i. In practical terms, this means that router i will have to reduce the number of connected
users or certain quality parameters of the provided services will have to be reduced, e.g. video
resolution or sound bit rate, in order not to overload the FiWi front end. If 
 +i
(t) is the one
that is too high, then at least one player in  +i is being too greedy and is lowering the payoff
of i. When a player is responsible for lowering the drop component of other players below the
specified threshold, and as a consequence is lowering their payoffs, it is considered a defection.
To safeguard itself, player i will have to lower the trust level of the source having excessive
traffic. From here on, this trust level reduction will be termed punishment or simply bandwidth
reduction. The exact value of the drop component threshold can be determined according to
the amount of packet drops that can be tolerated without affecting the services being provided
by the FiWi access network, which will be explained further on when presenting the algorithm
details.
During the algorithm execution, every router will try to optimize Ai , 
A
 +i
and i by choosing
the appropriate sharing and trust levels7. More specifically, every router i chooses values for
6Note that the drop component is zero if no drops exist and negative if drops occur.
7From here on, for briefness, Ai , 
A
 +i
, i and 

 +i
will be used instead of Ai (t), 
A
 +i
(t), i (t) and 

 +i
(t).
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Figure 5.3: Generic independent network.
ij , 
i
 +j
, i,  ij and  
i
 +j
. For instance, router 3 in Figure 5.3.2 chooses values for the following
variables: 34, 
3
5, 
3
 +4
, 3
 +5
, 3,  34 ,  
3
5 ,  
3
 +4
and  3
 +5
. Leaf routers, i.e. any router i with
+i = ;, only need to determine a value for i and set everything else to zero. Similarly, any
router i with +i =  
+
i , i.e. routers with only one level below, can set 
i
 +j
and  i
 +j
to zero,
8j 2 +i .
General Algorithm Behavior
In order to determine the just mentioned values/allocations, every router needs to communicate
its bandwidth needs for local and foreign traffic, i and 

 +i
. That can be done through the
use of REQUEST messages sent by routers. Note that we are not concerned here with signaling
protocol specifications. At this stage we just want to prove that the algorithm provides a fair and
efficient bandwidth allocation. When the time arrives, a leaf router i would send a REQUEST
message to its parent node  i . In the case of Figure 5.3.2, nodes 2, 6, 7, 8 and 9 send a
REQUEST message to their respective parent nodes. Upon reception of REQUEST messages,
a router must analyze all requests, its own bandwidth needs, and then send a new REQUEST
message to the router above containing all bandwidth requirements adjusted to the transfer
capacity between itself and the router above. For instance node 4 from Figure 5.3.2, after
receiving the requests from nodes 6 and 7, would analyze these requests, its own bandwidth
needs and adjust bandwidth requirements as follows: if node 4 can forward all traffic then a
REQUEST message for all the requested bandwidth is sent to node 3; otherwise, bandwidth
requirements are decreased accordingly and a REQUEST message is sent to router 3. Note that
it is not worth making higher requests than it is possible to forward, since this would lead to
lower payoffs.
The REQUEST messages keep being sent to the upper levels until the gateway is reached,
i.e. router i with  i = ;. The gateway then decides the values for its sharing levels, i +i ; 
i
j
and i
 +j
; 8j 2 +i , together with possible punishments, and sends RESPONSE messages to all
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its children nodes notifying the bandwidth allocated to them, Aj and 
A
 +j
; 8j 2 +i . Any router
receiving a RESPONSE checks the bandwidth allocated to itself, proceeds to a proportional
bandwidth distribution among nodes in  +i , and then sends a RESPONSE message for every
node in +i to notify the bandwidth allocated to them. This is done until all leaf routers receive
response messages. Any router trying to use more than the allocated bandwidth will suffer
packet losses.
Algorithm Details
We now present how the sharing levels are calculated by the algorithm, how the drop component
threshold is calculated and how a defecting router is detected. Concerning sharing levels, a
router i requesting i , for local traffic, and 

 +i
, for foreign traffic, calculates its sharing level
i
 +i
using expression

 +
i
i +

 +
i
. As for ij and 
i
 +j
, 8j 2 +i ; these are calculated using i +i
j

 +
i
and i
 +i

 +
j

 +
i
, respectively. These expressions ensure that conditions (5.13), (5.14) and (5.15) are
met when i + 

 +i
 capi. Considering condition (5.13), for example, and since 
d
i (t)+
u
i (t)
capi
=
i
capi
, we obtain 

i
capi
 1   i
 +i
, i
capi
 1  

 +
i
i +

 +
i
, i
capi
 i
i +

 +
i
, which is valid when
i + 

 +i
 capi. On the other hand, if i +  +i > capi, it means that losses will occur. If
the drop component is still greater than or equal to the threshold, i  thi , then no punishments
will be done. Otherwise, when i < thi , punishments will be done.
The calculation of the drop component threshold to use can be based on the following rela-
tion:
i  thi , (5.16)
, log

Ai
i

+ log
 
A
 +i

 +i
!
 thi , (5.17)
,
Ai 
A
 +i
i 

 +i
 10thi ;8i : +i 6= ;: (5.18)
This means that as long as the product of the ratios 
A
i
i
and
A
 +
i

 +
i
is greater than or equal to
10
th
i , no punishments will be done. The drop component threshold for router i will be set
according to the amount of local and foreign traffic that must be protected. For instance, a drop
component threshold equal to  0:0969 means that at least 80% of either the local or foreign
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traffic will be provided, since
Ai 
A
 +
i
i 

 +
i
 10 0:0969 ' 0:8. A drop component threshold equal
to zero, thi = 0, ensures full protection. As for leaf routers, a similar relation is obtained,
Ai
i
 10thi , 8i : +i = ;.
In what concerns to the detection of defecting routers, a router i with i < thi is able to
identify these defecting routers by finding the highest values among i ; 

j and

 +
j
j +j j ;8j 2 
+
i .
The highest values will then be reduced through trust level reductions until expression i  thi
becomes valid. This way, cooperating nodes will not be affected by defecting nodes.
The algorithm implementation details are summarized in the procedures of Figure 5.4 and
Figure 5.5, termed upward and downward procedure, respectively. The upward procedure is ex-
ecuted at every node upon the reception of REQUEST messages coming from wireless routers,
and flowing toward the gateway, while the downward procedure is executed at every router upon
the reception of RESPONSE messages, with bandwidth allocations assigned to users, flowing
toward the leaf nodes. In both these procedures, the function punishDefectingRouter is
responsible for reducing the highest values among i ; 

j and

 +
j
j +j j ; 8j 2 
+
i , ensuring i  thi ,
as previously described. The function lowerExcessiveRequests, used in the upward
procedure, detects whether requests will lead to situations where i < thi , independently of
the RESPONSE messages coming from  i . That is, it detects situations where one or more
nodes are certainly requesting too much traffic. In that case, adjustments equal to the ones in
function punishDefectingRouter are made until i  thi . This way router i will not
request bandwidth to routers in   i that i can not forward for sure, e.g. when capi < 

i + 

 +i
,
preventing allocation of bandwidth at   i that will not be used.
According to the model and algorithm presented in this chapter, bandwidth is allocated
proportionally among all wireless nodes in conformity with their requirements, as long as the
drop component is greater than or equal to the threshold. If the drop component falls below
the established threshold, then bandwidth will stop being allocated proportionally. That is,
more demanding routers will not be able to increase their allocations and the less demanding
routers will always have a minimum allocation, according to the value of the drop component
threshold. Here, this allocation is called limited proportional allocation, since bandwidth is
provided proportionally up until the limit specified by the drop component threshold.
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Procedure upwardAlgorithm (qk):
arrivedRequests qk
if jarrivedRequestsj = +i  then
/*Sum all the bandwidth requests received.*/

 +i
=
P
j2+i

j + 

 +j

if  i 6= ; then /*i is not a gateway.*/
/*Reduce excessive requests among i , 

j , and 

 +j
, that are not possible to forward.*/
lowerExcessiveRequests(arrivedRequests)
/*Send a REQUEST message to  i .*/
sendRequestTo i

i ; 

 +i

else /*i is a gateway*/
/*Calculate the drop component, check defections and punish defecting routers until
i  thi , if needed.*/
repeat
/*Calculate the sharing levels and drop component.*/
i
 +i
=

 +
i
i +

 +
i
A
 +i
= capi
i
 +i
Ai = capi

1  i
 +i

i = log

Ai
i

+ log
 
A
 +
i

 +
i
!
if i < thi then /*Defection detected.*/
punishDefectingRouter (arrivedRequests)
end if
until i < thi
/*Send a RESPONSE message to every j 2 +i .*/
for all j 2 +i do
ij = 
i
 +i
j

 +
i
i
 +j
= i
 +i

 +
j

 +
i
sendResponseToj

capi
i
j; capi
i
 +j

end for
end if
end if
Figure 5.4: Executed on router i upon arrival of a REQUEST message qk from any child router k 2 +i .
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Procedure downwardAlgorithm (rk):
Ai = extractBandwidthToItself(rk)
A
 +i
= extractBandwidthToFwd(rk)
if capi < Ai +A +i then /*k allocated more than capi (could happen if capk > capi). Reduce
allocation accordingly.*/
Ai = capi
Ai
Ai +
A
 +
i
A
 +i
= capi
A
 +
i
Ai +
A
 +
i
end if
/*Calculate the drop component, check defections and punish defecting routers until i  thi ,
if needed.*/
repeat
if +i 6= ; then /*i is not a leaf*/
i = log

Ai
i

+ log
 
A
 +
i

 +
i
!
else /*i is a leaf*/
i = log

Ai
i

end if
if i < thi then /*Defection detected.*/
punishDefectingRouter (arrivedRequests)
end if
until i < thi
/*Calculate sharing levels and send a RESPONSE message for every child.*/
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i
capi
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end for
Figure 5.5: Executed on router i upon arrival of a RESPONSE message rk from parent router k =  i .
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5.4 Simulation and Results
To analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm, a network simulation model has been
implemented. The objective of simulations is to evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithm in terms of protection given to less demanding nodes, throughput and delay. For that
purpose, our algorithm was tested alongside two other algorithms: first in first out (FIFO) and
weighted fair queuing (WFQ) [98]. With FIFO, no allocations or priorities are set and, as such,
less demanding routers have no protection against more demanding ones. This is one of the
most widely used scheduling protocols in packet switching networks, mainly due to its simple
queuing policy. In the context of our simulations, it will allow us to get a sense of the degree of
protection that the other algorithms give to less demanding nodes.
The WFQ and the weighted round robin (WRR) are two scheduling policies typically used
in PONs. In WRR, every stream of packets has its own queue and these queues are then served
with respect to their weights in a round robin fashion. However, WRR has a packet granularity
problem since size of packets is not considered [99]. That is, streams with larger packets will
have a higher bit rate and consume more bandwidth. WFQ solves this granularity problem by
considering the size of packets [98]. A bit-wise decision, instead of packet-wise, on the next
queue being served is made, also in a round robin manner. In summary, both WRR and WFQ
methods serve the queues with respect to their weights, but WFQ does it in a more complex and
accurate way. For this reason, and for a clearer analysis, only WFQ has been implemented for
comparison with the proposed algorithm.
When implementing the WFQ at some node, the downstream traffic directed to a specific
wireless node will have its own queue. Note that traffic is being differentiated on a per node
basis and not on a service stream basis. Since our algorithm seeks for fair bandwidth allocation,
we should compare it with WFQ having equal weights for every queue, so that equal bandwidth
access opportunities is promoted. The same happens for upstream traffic coming from a certain
wireless source, which must reach the optical section. For instance, the uplink connection of
node 1 from Figure 5.6(a) will have 5 queues, one for each source using this uplink. If fair
bandwidth is to be provided, then all 5 queues at the uplink of node 1 will have weights equal
to 1
5
.
5.4.1 Simulation Setup
The networks used in our simulations are exhibited in Figure 5.6. The structures of the network
in Figures 5.6(a), 5.6(b) and 5.6(c) are similar to the independent networks identified in the FiWi
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Figure 5.6: Simulated independent networks.
access network of Figure 5.1. As for Figure 5.6(d), it is used to test the protection provided to
less demanding routers in structures with a higher depth. Note that, in FiWi access networks, it
is not desirable to have too many wireless routers per gateway or to have wireless routers that
are too many hops away from a gateway, since this would negatively affect the QoS. The optical
link capacity is assumed to be five times the wireless transfer capacity.
The network simulation model was implemented using the OMNet++ discrete event plat-
form [100]. Basically, every wireless node is composed of five modules, as illustrated in Figure
5.7: Receiver, Sink, Statistics, Queue Logic and Traffic Generator. The Receiver is responsi-
ble for directing packets either to the Sink module, for local absorption, or to the Queue Logic
module, for forwarding. That is, if the packet is destined to the node itself, then it is sent to the
Sink module. On the other hand, if the packet is destined to some other node, then it will be
sent to the Queue Logic for forwarding. The Queue Logic module implements the scheduling
policies being tested: the proposed algorithm, FIFO and WFQ. Both Sink and Queue Logic
modules will send statistical messages to the Statistics module. These messages include infor-
mation related to successful packet deliveries, packet drops and waiting times in queue. The
Statistics module is responsible for storing the information delivered by the Sink and Queue
Logic modules for further analysis. As for the Traffic Generator, this module is responsible for
generating traffic with the statistical behavior described next.
The traffic modeling in our simulations was accomplished through the Pareto and exponen-
tial distributions. The Pareto distribution was used to model packet size and the exponential
distribution to model inter arrival times [97]. The Pareto distribution was configured with a
scale of 2025:7833 and a shape of 5:1430, to emulate the HTTP traffic behavior, according
to [97]. The  parameter of the exponential distribution was calculated based on an intended
load. That is, the mean inter arrival time will be  1i =
p
capiLi
, where p is the Pareto mean and
Li is the intended load for node i, 0 < Li  1 (0 = no load; 1 = full capacity utilization).
65
5.4. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
Packet
input
Packet
output
Modules:
Receiver
Queue Logic
Sink
Statistics
Traffic Generator
Flows:
Stream packet flow Statistical messages
R
Sk S QL
TG
R
QL
Sk
S
TG
Figure 5.7: Node modules implemented in simulation.
An exception is made for local traffic generation at gateways, for which a mean inter arrival
time equal to  1i =
p
capi
5
Li
is used. This is because the capacity of optical links is considered
to be five times the capacity of wireless connections, and this fact should not have impact on
local traffic generation at gateways. The downstream load was considered to be three times the
upstream load, since downstream traffic in access networks is usually higher [97].
To demonstrate that our algorithm is able to detect defecting nodes with excessive loads, that
could penalize the QoS of others, some nodes of the independent networks were set with a high
load of 0.8, while the others were set with a load of 0.25. The average of the results obtained,
considering all possible combinations of high and low load assignment to nodes, are compared
for the different scheduling algorithms. Also, simulations were run for two drop component
threshold values, thi = 0 and 
th
i =  0:17, to test different levels of protection. Note that router
2 from Figure 5.6(a), Figure 5.6(b) and Figure 5.6(d), and routers 4 and 5 from Figure 5.6(c)
are not potential defecting nodes because the optical link was assumed to have sufficiently high
bandwidth to accommodate the traffic from all directly connected wireless routers, meaning that
routers directly connected to the gateway will never compete for bandwidth. Hence, only the
remaining routers will be set with different high and low bandwidth needs.
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Figure 5.8: Average throughput ratio obtained by FIFO, proposed algorithm and WFQ. WFQ was set
with equal weights among all queues and the proposed algorithm was tested with thi = 0 and 
th
i =
 0:17. Load of less demanding nodes = 0:25; Load of over demanding nodes = 0:8. Queues with a
maximum capacity of 40 packets were used.
5.4.2 Results Discussion
In Figure 5.8, it is possible to compare the average throughput ratios obtained by FIFO, the
proposed algorithm and WFQ, assuming that the throughput ratio of a wireless node i was
calculated using the expression throughput experienced by i
capi
. For the proposed algorithm, simulations
were done for thi = 0 and 
th
i =  0:17, 8i 2 W , where thi = 0 means that requests from
less demanding nodes will be fully protected and thi =  0:17 ensures that the less demanding
receive an allocation of at least 66% (approximately two thirds) of the requested bandwidth,
10 0:17 ' 0:66, (see Section 5.3.2). WFQ was set with equal queue weights as previously
stated.
Results show that, when FIFO is used, the less demanding nodes are severely penalized,
obtaining a throughput much lower than the assigned load. More specifically, the effective
throughput of less demanding nodes was approximately half of the load set for these nodes
(0:25), while the remaining packets were dropped. The proposed approach and the WFQ were
both able to protect less demanding nodes from the greediness of nodes with excessive traffic.
For thi = 0; 8i 2 W , the throughput obtained by these two schemes was, in fact, similar.
An advantage of the proposed algorithm is that it is flexible and can be configured to provide
the level of protection desired by the network administrators. In the case of Figure 5.8, when
thi =  0:17 is used, it is guaranteed that the less demanding nodes will receive at least 66%
of their throughput needs. For WFQ to change the level of protection of less demanding nodes,
all weights would need to be recalculated to reflect load changes. Our algorithm provides
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Figure 5.9: Packet average time in queue. The proposed algorithm was set with thi = 0; 8i 2 W and
WFQ with equal weights among all queues. Loads of more demanding nodes and less demanding nodes
are set to: (a) 0:8 and 0:25, respectively; (b) 0:5 and 0:1, respectively.
protection to less demanding nodes according to thi ; 8i 2 W , regardless of which wireless
nodes are the less demanding.
In what concerns to queuing delay, the proposed algorithm presents much better results in
terms of fairness than WFQ, as shown in Figure 5.9(a). This has to do with two issues. First of
all, WFQ will forward packets in queues according to the weights of these queues. Since equal
weights were given, packets from less demanding nodes will more often get ahead of already
queued packets from more demanding nodes. With the proposed algorithm, packets are inserted
in queue according to their arrival and, as such, contrarily to what happens when WFQ is used,
queuing delays of packets belonging to more demanding wireless nodes are not affected. Be-
sides this, our algorithm adopts a preventive behavior when dealing with excessive packets of
over demanding nodes, which WFQ does not. That is, our algorithm discards excessive packets
that are expected to be dropped at some point later in the path, avoiding unfruitful use of re-
sources and increased queuing delay that these excessive packets cause to other packets. WFQ,
on the other hand, does not have this preventive behavior. That is, packets will be accepted and
forwarded as long as there is capacity, even if there is a high probability of being dropped at sub-
sequent nodes, due to insufficient resources. As a result, with WFQ, resources are wasted when
packets do not reach their destination and unnecessary queuing delays are added. A smaller gap
on average delay exists between the WFQ and the proposed algorithm if loads are reduced, as
can be seen in Figure 5.9(b).
In order to ensure fairness in delay when using WFQ, one might think that weights could be
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Figure 5.10: Effect of the weight increase of over demanding nodes, wod, relative to the weight of
less demanding nodes, wld, in terms of: (a) average waiting time in queue; (b) throughput ratio. Over
demanding nodes were set with a load of 0:8 and less demanding nodes with 0:25. Queues with a
maximum capacity of 40 packets were used.
adjusted. This approach, however, would decrease the protection provided to less demanding
nodes, as can be seen in Figure 5.10. For this reason, WFQ seems to be more appropriate
to control the waiting time in queue of specific streams, rather than finding an equilibrium in
both bandwidth access and delay for every node. For example, WFQ would be suitable to
control waiting times of different types of streams, such as VoIP, IPTV and data traffic. On the
other hand, the algorithm being proposed here is suitable for bandwidth access control while
providing similar queuing delay conditions to users.
Another observation is related with the effect that the number of over demanding nodes has
on results. Results show that full protection is still provided to less demanding routers even
when there are many over demanding routers, which does not happen with FIFO. Figure 5.11
compares the average throughput ratio of the less demanding nodes when using the proposed
algorithm, WFQ and FIFO. As the number of over demanding nodes increases, the throughput
of less demanding nodes reduces when using FIFO, while the proposed algorithm and WFQ
were able to keep the throughput of less demanding nodes. This means that, despite the conges-
tion increase, caused by the higher number of over demanding nodes, the less demanding ones
can still maintain a steady throughput.
Concerning the depth of the independent network structure, and according to Figure 5.12,
results show that this has no influence on the throughput achieved by the less demanding nodes
when the proposed algorithm is used. For instance, the throughput of the less demanding nodes
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Figure 5.11: Average throughput ratio experienced by the less demanding nodes when a different num-
ber of over demanding nodes exist. The proposed algorithm was set with thi = 0; 8i 2 W and WFQ
with equal weights among all queues. Loads of more demanding nodes and less demanding nodes are
set to 0:8 and 0:25, respectively. Queues with a maximum capacity of 40 packets were used.
in the independent networks of Figure 5.6(a) and Figure 5.6(d) are similar, despite the structure
from Figure 5.6(d) being deeper.
It is worth noting the similar gap between FIFO and the other two approaches in Figure
5.12 for the independent networks of Figure 5.6(a) and Figure 5.6(b), despite the structure from
Figure 5.6(b) being deeper. That is because the number of routers sharing the same connection
to the gateway is the same. In the independent network from Figure 5.6(c), the gap between
FIFO and the other two approaches is the smallest of all tested networks, since only two routers
share the same connection with the gateway. A small gap means that the less demanding nodes
require a low protection, while a high gap means that a great protection is needed. As such, and
according to Figure 5.12, the protection needed by the less demanding nodes depends on the
number of routers sharing the same connection to a gateway.
To better understand that our algorithm will not allow nodes to hurt the QoS of others, we
have simulated a scenario where node 3 from the independent network in Figure 5.6(b) increases
its load from 0:25 to 0:8 at the simulation time t = 3000s, while others keep their load of 0:25.
In Figure 5.13, it is possible to see the effect that such increase has on nodes 4 and 5. If FIFO
is used, the throughput of nodes 4 and 5 drops immediately. Our algorithm is able to recognize
that the increase in load by node 3 would hurt the performance of other nodes, and node 3 is
obligated to deny the excessive requests so that other nodes are not affected.
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Figure 5.12: Average throughput ratio experienced by the less demanding nodes in the various inde-
pendent networks tested. The proposed algorithm was set with thi = 0; 8i 2 W and WFQ with equal
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Figure 5.13: Average throughput ratio of nodes 4 and 5 from independent network of Figure 5.6(b) when
node 3 increases its load from 0.25 to 0.8 at 3000s. The proposed algorithmwas set with thi = 0; 8i 2 W
and WFQ with equal weights among all queues. Queues with a maximum capacity of 40 packets were
used.
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5.5 Conclusions
The analysis proves that the proposed algorithm is able to protect the less demanding nodes
from the greediness of the over demanding nodes, avoiding starvation for bandwidth. More-
over, delays are kept similar among all users, easing further development of QoS schemes that
are able to prioritize traffic with different requirements (IPTV, VoIP, web, etc.) in the same
distribution network.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, a repeated game model is presented, where all wireless routers are players that
want to forward as much traffic as possible. This model led to the development of a bandwidth
allocation algorithm with fairness concerns. With this algorithm, bandwidth is allocated pro-
portionally among all wireless nodes, according to their requirements, as long as fairness is
being provided to less demanding wireless nodes. This type of allocation was termed limited
proportional allocation, since bandwidth is proportionally allocated as long as less demanding
routers receive a minimum bandwidth. The level of protection, i.e. the minimum bandwidth
that less demanding routers receive, is specified by a parameter, meaning that the algorithm
can be configured according to the network needs. Moreover, the proposed algorithm is also
able to obtain fairness in terms of queuing delays. This opens way for implementation of QoS
support since it becomes easier to ensure the correct operation of services in networks with fair
conditions, both in terms of bandwidth and experienced delays.
72
C H A P T E R 6
Energy Efficient Routing Algorithm
6.1 Introduction
Energy efficiency is becoming an increasingly important issue. In communication infrastruc-
tures, the majority of the energy is consumed at the access section, where new technologies have
been proposed recently to fulfill the growing demands for bandwidth and ubiquity [80, 101].
One of such technologies is the FiWi access network. The front end of FiWi access networks
can be a wireless mesh with wireless routers scattered throughout an area. This mesh topology
provides great routing flexibility, which can be exploited to improve energy efficiency [94,102].
For instance, routes longer than the shortest ones can be used in order to improve sleeping pe-
riods of devices throughout the network.
In this chapter, an energy efficient routing algorithm is proposed for FiWi access networks.
To achieve such goal, firstly, a network model is developed, based on network formation theory.
This model needs to be aware of features and capabilities of wireless and optical technologies
to achieve overall energy efficiency at front and back end. With the model in place, several
formation processes were then tested in order to obtain insights on how energy efficient routes
can be created, and where in the network it is more likely that route changes will improve
energy efficiency. Based on the obtained insights, a heuristic algorithm is proposed, tested and
analyzed.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, some network formation
theory concepts are adjusted to the problem in question. An energy consumption model is
presented in Section 6.3. Then, all formation processes are tested and analyzed in Section 6.4.
Based on this analysis, a heuristic algorithm is developed, tested and analyzed in Section 6.5.
Finally, this chapter ends with a summary.
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Contributions:
i) Development of a model based on network formation theory to study the establishment of
energy efficient routes in FiWi access networks with a WMN front end.
ii) Development of a new stability concept and adapt dynamic network formation processes in
order to be compatible with the objective of building energy efficient routes.
iii) Analysis of the results of the network formation processes and obtain insights on how routes
can be established to increase energy efficiency and traffic delivered with success.
iv) Development of an energy efficient heuristic algorithm to establish efficient routes, both in
terms of energy efficiency and in terms of traffic delivered successfully.
Publications:
The work in this chapter has been published in [27, 28].
6.2 Routing through Network Formation
Unlike to the previous two chapters, here independent networks will be formed, i.e., are not
given in advance. This formation of the tree structured independent networks resembles co-
operative games, where players form coalitions in order to improve their outcome. However,
coalition game theory considers only which players form the coalitions, while in our case the
connections actually established between players are important, i.e. who is connected to whom.
Network formation theory addresses such kind of formation, examining which players are part
of each group and which connections are actually established inside each group [21].
In this chapter, unlike the previous ones, the ONUs are the root nodes of the independent
networks. Hence, gateway routers still have one node above them,  i 6= ;;8i 2 G. The reason
for this difference is that, both energy expenditures of the optical and radio transceivers need to
be considered. Note, however, that ONUs will not be players. Wireless routers and gateways,
collectively called wireless nodes, will be the players in this chapter.
Every wireless node, i 2 W , is a player trying to establish the best wireless connections in
order to obtain energy efficient routes. In accordance to Definition 2.13, the term component
will be used when referring to a group of players with established connections among them.
More specifically, each independent network will be a component, which can be redefined using
the nomenclature from Section 3.3.
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Definition 6.1 (Component) A component is a group of wireless routers/players where, for
any combination of two of its elements i 2 W and j 2 W , i 6= j, the following condition is
true:
fig [   i 	 \ fjg [   j 	 6= ;.
A connection established between wireless nodes i 2 W and j 2 W , i 6= j, is denoted by
ij. The set of all the established connections form a network LE , and the set of all possible
networks is represented by L. Each network LE 2 L, as a result of the established connections,
has its own network value that can be calculated using a value function, introduced in Definition
2.14. For the problem addressed in this chapter, the network value will measure the energy
efficiency obtained by the established routes. Therefore, the objective is to reach a network
LE 2 L with the highest possible network value. Such network is termed efficient network, as
in the Definition 2.18.
A network value is a common value that may be distributed among players, wireless nodes
in our case. This is done by means of an allocation rule, already introduced in Definition 2.15.
Every wireless node will try to improve its allocation value as much as possible by carefully
establishing and severing wireless connections. This will be done by fulfilling some network
formation process, discussed in the following section. When no player is able to increase its
allocation value, following such network formation process, then the network is said to be
stable. According to Section 2.5.3, stability has been modeled in many different ways in the
literature. However, those stability models allow stable networks to have unconnected players.
Such situation is not desirable for the problem addressed in this chapter because it would allow
the existence of unconnected wireless routers, which would not be able to send/receive traffic.
Here, a new stability notion, termed complete connection stability, is presented.
Definition 6.2 (Complete Connection Stable Network) A network LE 2 L is complete con-
nection stable if all the following conditions hold:
1. for all i 2 R, there exists one path n1; n2; : : : ; nK such that 8k 2 f1; : : : ; K   1g ;
nknk+1 2 LE; n1 = i and nK 2 G,
2. for all ij 2 LE and all z 2 W:
(a) i
 LE  i  LE n fijg	 [ fizg and z  LE  z  LE n fijg	 [ fizg,
(b) j
 LE  j  LE n fijg	 [ fjzg and z  LE  z  LE n fijg	 [ fjzg.
The complete connection stability dictates through condition 1 that every wireless router has
one uplink wireless connection that leads to a gateway router. Also, through conditions 2a and
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2b, wireless nodes can not increase their allocation values by switching their current uplink
connection by another one.
Wireless nodes will keep improving their allocation values until a stable network is reached.
However, if the stability model of Definition 6.2 is assumed, then the resulting network may not
be the most efficient one because only pairs of directly connected players are being checked for
better allocation values at conditions 2a and 2b of Definition 6.2. As explained in Section 2.5.3,
some allocation improvements may only be achieved by establishing and/or severing two or
more wireless connections simultaneously, which by themselves alone do not bring any benefit.
The strong stability from Definition 2.17 could be used instead. However, it would be com-
putationally too expensive, since all combinations of connections would have to be tested for
allocation value improvements. Note that the objective is to develop an energy efficient routing
algorithm and computing the algorithm also consumes energy. Therefore, a computationally
expensive routing algorithm could deter any efficiency gained by careful route choices [103]. A
stable and non efficient network will be termed, from here on, as hidden profitable network.
Definition 6.3 (Hidden Profitable Network) A network LE 2 L is a hidden profitable net-
work if it is complete connection stable, according to Definition 6.2, while not being efficient,
according to Definition 2.18.
6.2.1 Network Formation Processes
Complete connection stability merely indicates the desired network configuration properties. A
process is still needed to actually achieve a complete connection stable and, if possible, efficient
network. That is, connections will have to be established or severed to create routes that are as
energy efficient as possible. Here, the focus will be on dynamic approaches where networks are
formed over several iterations.
Before introducing the formation processes considered in this chapter, it is important to note
that different schemes can be used by the MAC layer for bandwidth access. In this chapter, a
MAC layer based on a bandwidth allocation scheme is assumed, instead of a collision avoid-
ance one. This assumption is related with the fact that bandwidth allocation based MACs are
more energy efficient than the collision avoidance schemes. This is so because collisions may
still be frequent in a collision avoidance scheme, leading to retransmissions and unfruitful use
of bandwidth and energy [103]. Moreover, formation processes require accurate information
on the length of scheduled transmission, reception and sleep periods, which can be easily ob-
tained if a bandwidth allocation based MAC is used. With a collision avoidance scheme, such
information would be less precise or difficult to obtain.
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The dynamic network formation processes under analysis are discussed next.
Dynamic Network Formation (DNF)
This approach, introduced in Section 2.5.3, starts from an empty network, with no established
connections, and then establishes or severs connections, at each iteration, in order to increase
the allocation values of the players involved in the connection establishment/dissolution. The
process ends when a stable network is reached.
The DNF has one drawback. There is no guarantee that every wireless router will have
one established uplink connection, i.e. a wireless connection that leads to a gateway router in
order to send traffic to/from the Internet. Moreover, it is even possible to get stuck at an empty
network, i.e. a network without any established connection. Such scenarios contradict the first
condition of the complete connection stability from Definition 6.2, which dictates that every
wireless router i 2 R needs to have one established connection that leads to a gateway router.
That is, a complete connected stable network may not be reached. Hence, a modified version
of DNF is presented. This modified DNF starts from a network LE where every wireless router
has already one established uplink connection. From this starting point, and at each iteration,
one established uplink connection may be replaced by another one that is not in use, ensuring
that every wireless router has one established uplink connection. Its operation can be described
as follows:
Step 1: Randomly choose a wireless router i 2 R.
Step 2: Determine if i can have its allocation value increased by replacing its current uplink
connection, ij 2 LE , by another one that is not in use, ik =2 LE . Note that the wireless
node k, at the other end of the new uplink connection, will only accept this new connec-
tion if it does not decrease its own allocation value. If there is more than one wireless
connection that satisfies this condition, then the one that provides the highest allocation
value increase to i is used. In case the uplink connection of i is changed, allocation values
of wireless nodes affected by this change will have to be recalculated.
Step 3: If the current network, LE 2 L, is complete connection stable, then the process ends.
Otherwise, go back to Step 1.
From here on, this modified DNF will simply be called DNF.
A drawback of DNF, however, is that it may get stuck in a hidden profitable network. Two
possible approaches to overcome this issue are: i) a stochastic approach similar to the one
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introduced in Section 2.5.3; ii) a farsighted approach similar to the one introduced in Section
2.5.3. These two approaches are discussed next.
Stochastic Network Formation (SNF)
This approach randomizes decisions in order to disrupt hidden profitable networks and unlock
further improvements. Here, an SNF, based on the DNF just presented, is proposed. It is
composed of two stages. At the first stage, DNF is run until a complete connected stable network
is reached. Then an iterative second stage starts where, similarly to DNF, a wireless router is
randomly chosen at each iteration. If the chosen wireless router has a link that provides a greater
bandwidth allocation, then that link may be chosen to become the next uplink connection with
probability . If more than one connection can improve the bandwidth allocation, then the first
to be found, and chosen with probability , will be the one used. Note that only connections
improving the bandwidth allocation are considered. This avoids pure random choices that could
result in meaningless connection changes. Whenever a change is made at the second stage, the
first stage will be run again. The SNF ends when no changes occur at the second stage or after
the first stage has run for a maximum number of specified times. SNF can be described as
follows:
Step 1: Run DNF.
Step 2: Start second stage:
Step 2.1: Randomly choose a wireless router i 2 R.
Step 2.2: Search for wireless connections of i that are not being used and can increase the
bandwidth allocation of i if used as its new uplink. The first of such connections to be
found, and selected with probability , will become the new uplink of i. In case the uplink
connection of i has changed, allocation values of wireless nodes affected by this change
will have to be recalculated and the process will move on to the next step. Otherwise, if
no changes occurred, then the process will end.
Step 2.3: If DNF, at step 1, ran already for the maximum number of times, then end the process.
Otherwise, go back to Step 1.
Farsighted Network Formation (FNF)
This approach tries to predict connection changes that are not immediately profitable but will
allow higher improvements in the future. Here, a DNF composed of two stages is proposed. At
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the first stage, DNF is run until a complete connection stable network is reached. Then a second
iterative stage starts where a group of wireless routers are randomly chosen at each iteration. If
that group of wireless routers can increase their allocation values by simultaneously changing
their uplink connections, then the uplink connections will be changed accordingly. Note that
these uplink changes would not be profitable if done individually. Only a limited number of
simultaneous uplink changes can be tested, otherwise the processing time would be very long.
The objective of this second stage is to get out of hidden profitable networks, where DNF gets
stuck, improving allocation and network values. When a change is made at the second stage,
the first stage will then be run again. If no changes occur at the second stage, then FNF ends
execution. FNF can be described as follows:
Step 1: Run DNF.
Step 2: Start second stage:
Step 2.1: Randomly choose a group of wireless routers, either belonging to the same compo-
nent or different components. The number of wireless routers to choose is equal to the
number of allowed simultaneous uplink changes.
Step 2.2: Calculate the allocation values for all combinations of uplink changes involving the
chosen wireless routers.
Step 2.3: If there are combinations of uplink changes that lead to allocation value increases,
then choose the combination that provides the highest aggregate increase to all wireless
routers and go back to Step 1. Otherwise, proceed to the next step. In case of uplink
connection changes, allocation values of wireless nodes affected by these changes will
have to be recalculated.
Step 2.4: If all combinations of wireless routers were already chosen in Step 2.1 without any
uplink connection change, then the process will end. Otherwise, go back to Step 2.1 to
choose another group of wireless routers.
6.3 Energy Efficient Routing Model
6.3.1 Energy Consumption
Energy efficient routing methods in FiWi access networks should be aware of the capabilities
of optical and wireless technologies in an integrated manner. That is, routes at the wireless
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front end should be established by taking into consideration the energy consumption of optical
and wireless transceivers, as well as the scheduling policy for sleeping periods. Here, it will
be assumed that nodes will always go to sleep whenever there are no scheduled transmissions
or receptions of local or foreign traffic. The only exception is when the time until the next
scheduled transmission or reception is shorter than the time needed to switch to sleep mode
and wake up again. This time, during which a node is in wake mode without transmitting or
receiving traffic, is called unproductive time and the energy consumed during this period is
termed unproductive energy.
When accounting for the total energy expenditure, one has to consider that traffic from/to
a source/sink will be forwarded through several hops, affecting wake, sleep and unproductive
periods of several nodes. Hence, each wireless node i 2 W will be held accountable for part of
the energy consumed at nodes in   i . More specifically, i 2 W will be accountable for: i) the
energy that nodes in   i consume to transmit/receive traffic belonging to i; ii) part of the energy
that nodes in   i consume while in sleep mode; iii) part of the unproductive energy that nodes
in   i consume. These three constituents of the energy consumption will be denoted by e
DLV
i ,
eSLPi and e
UNP
i , respectively. The total energy consumed by all transceivers, in order to send
and receive traffic emanating/arriving from/to a node i 2 W , can be calculated by:
ei = e
DLV
i + e
SLP
i + e
UNP
i : (6.1)
When determining eDLVi , e
SLP
i and e
UNP
i , the term byte time will be used to refer to the time
that one byte takes to be transmitted or received by a device, which can be a wireless radio or
an optical transceiver, with its meaning and value being changed accordingly. The following
notation is assumed for values that do not change during network lifetime:
EO: Energy per byte time that is consumed by the transceiver of an ONU in wake mode.
ET : Energy per byte time that is consumed by a wireless radio in transmit mode.
ER: Energy per byte time that is consumed by a wireless radio in receive mode.
ESi : Energy per byte time that is consumed by the transceiver of node i 2 N in sleep mode.
EWi : Energy per byte time that is consumed by the transceiver of node i 2 N when waking up.
Besides the just mentioned notation, additional variables become necessary, which may change
according to network conditions such as the currently established routes:
i: Local traffic load of wireless node i 2 W .
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Ai : Bandwidth allocation at i 2 W for downstream and upstream local traffic. It is assumed
that TDM is used by transmissions within the interference range, hence, Ai will be ad-
justed according to the load and bandwidth allocation of interfering nodes, so that the
medium is shared and interferences are avoided.
hi: Number of hops between wireless router i 2 R and its gateway along the corresponding
component.
Si : Average number of byte times per second that a node i 2 N spends in sleep mode.
Wi : Average number of byte times per second that a node i 2 N takes to wake up.
URi : Average number of byte times per second that the radio of a wireless node i 2 W spends
in receive mode without actually receiving traffic. That is, unproductive time while in
receive mode.
UTi : Average number of byte times per second that the radio of a wireless node i 2 W spends
in transmit mode without actually transmitting traffic. That is, unproductive time while
in transmit mode.
UWi : Average number of byte times that the optical transceiver of an ONU i 2 O spends in
wake mode without actually transmitting or receiving any traffic. That is, unproductive
time in wake mode.
Energy consumed when delivering traffic
As aforementioned, packets will have to go through several hops in order to reach a specific
ONU or wireless router, considering upstream and downstream transmissions respectively. This
means that an average of Ai bytes per second, emanating/arriving from/to wireless router i, will
consume Ai
 
hi
 
ET + ER

Joules per second at the front end, assuming that wireless radio
transceivers consume ET Joules per byte time in transmit mode, ER Joules per byte time in
receive mode and that i is hi hops away from its gateway router. As for the back end, it is
considered that the transceiver of an ONU consumes EO Joules per byte time when in wake
mode to send/receive packets. Therefore, the energy expenditure per second to ensure a deliver
of Ai bytes per second to/from node i is:
eDLVi = 
A
i
 
EO + hi
 
ET + ER

: (6.2)
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For simplicity, the energy consumed to transfer packets between gateway routers and ONUs is
not taken into consideration, as gateway routers can be connected or attached to ONUs in many
different ways and can support many different working modes [13, 104].
Energy consumed when in sleep mode
Assuming that the transceiver of a node i 2 N consumes ESi Joules per byte time in sleep
mode and, on average, stays in that mode for Si byte times per second, then i will consume an
average of Si E
S
i Joules per second while in sleep mode. The time that i takes to wake up from
sleep/standby needs also to be considered. If node i 2 N takes an average of Wi byte times
per second to wake up and uses EWi Joules per byte time, then it will consume 
S
i E
S
i + 
W
i E
W
i
Joules per second during sleep mode and while waking up.
The time that a node i 2 N stays in sleep mode depends on local traffic and on traffic
to/from nodes in  +i . Therefore, the energy spent in sleep mode should be divided among all
nodes in  +i [fig. Similarly, i also influences the sleeping periods of nodes in   i and, as such,
should be held accountable for a portion of the energy that those nodes consume while in sleep
mode and waking up. Hence, node i 2 W is responsible for the consumption of the following
amount of sleep mode energy:
eSLPi =
264 X
j2f(  i [fig)\Wg
Sj E
S
j + 
W
j E
W
j +j [ fjg
375+ S  i \OES  i \O + W  i \OEW  i \O +
  i \O
 ; (6.3)
where the first part accounts for the consumption at wireless nodes in
 
  i [ fig
 \W	, that
will be required to forward traffic belonging to i, and the second part accounts for the consump-
tion at the ONU being used by i,   i \ O.
Unproductive energy consumed in wake mode
Assuming that the radio of a wireless node i 2 W spends an average of UTi and URi byte times
per second in transmit and receive mode, respectively, without sending or receiving traffic, then
the unproductive energy consumed per second at i will be: URi E
R+UTi E
T . Similarly to wire-
less nodes, ONUs may also have unproductive time periods. Considering that the transceiver of
the ONU, used by a wireless router i 2 W , stays in wake mode for UW
  i \O
byte times per second
on average without sending or receiving traffic, then the ONU will consume UW
  i \O
EO Joules
of unproductive energy per second. Similarly to what was done in expression (6.3), the unpro-
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ductive energy consumed at node i 2 N should be divided among all nodes in  +i [ fig, and a
portion of the unproductive energy of nodes in   i should be assigned to i. Hence, every node
i 2 W is responsible for the consumption of the following amount of unproductive energy:
eUNPi =
264 X
j2f(  i [fig)\Wg
URj E
R + UTj E
T +j [ fjg
375+ UW  i \OEO +
  i \O
 ; (6.4)
where the first part accounts for the consumption at wireless nodes in
 
  i [ fig
 \W	, that
will be required to forward traffic belonging to i, and the second part accounts for the consump-
tion at the ONU being used by i,   i \ O.
6.3.2 Network Model
Since our goal is to find the most energy efficient routes, expressions (6.2), (6.3) and (6.4) will
become part of the value function, 
 LE, so that a network value is obtained (see Definition
2.14 in Section 2.5.2). One might think that
P
i2W 
A
iP
i2W ei
should be used to calculate the network
value. However, the use of such function may lead to paths that, although energy efficient,
would forward just a small fraction of the intended traffic. To avoid this, the fraction of traffic
successfully delivered,
P
i2W 
A
iP
i2W i
, should also be taken in consideration. Hence, the network
value of a network LE 2 L is calculated using:

 LE = Pi2W AiP
i2W ei
P
i2W 
A
iP
i2W i
: (6.5)
As for the allocation rule used to distribute the network value among all wireless nodes, an
egalitarian allocation rule is used:
i
 LE =   LEjWj : (6.6)
This allocation rule distributes the network value equally among all players, aligning the net-
work value with the individual interests of players and avoiding cycles [42]. In the context of
FiWi access networks, the existence of such cycles, which were introduced in Section 2.5.3,
would mean that wireless routers would always be changing their uplink connections without
ever stabilize.
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Table 6.1: Parameters of generated networks.
Number of wireless nodes, jWj 15; 19; 23; 27
Number of gateways, jGj 3; 4; 5
Load ranges of wireless nodes 0-0:5; 0:2-0:7; 0-1; 0:5-1
Average node degree 4:5
6.4 Comparison of Network Formation Processes
6.4.1 Simulation Setup
In order to identify the formation process that gives rise to the most energy efficient network,
and to understand how each process changes the network in order to increase energy efficiency,
which will be useful to develop an efficient heuristic algorithm, a set of simulations were done.
For this purpose, several random networks were generated using the weighted proximity al-
gorithm in [105]. The parameters used to build these networks are summarized in Table 6.1.
Different combinations of network size, gateway set and load range were tested. Ten different
networks of each size were created and, for each network, five different gateway placements
were done, for jGj = 3, 4 and 5. A uniform distribution was used to select gateway routers
among network nodes. For each combination of network size, gateway placement and load,
five simulations were done using different seeds for random number generation. ONUs and
gateways are directly attached.
In what concerns to network formation processes, as explained in Section 6.2.1, a starting
point is needed where every wireless router has already one established uplink connection that
leads to a gateway. In these simulations, the shortest path (SP) was used as the input for all
formation processes since it is a widely used routing method and may serve as a reference. FNF
was set to test at most three uplink changes simultaneously and to run until no changes occur at
the second stage. As for SNF, different experiments were done for different values of  (from
0:1 to 0:5, in steps of 0:1) and it was set to run the first stage up to five iterations.
The considered energy consumptions per byte time are shown in Table 6.2. Such values
were obtained considering that ONUs have a bandwidth capacity of 1Gbps for upstream and
1Gbps for downstream, consume 3:85W in wake mode, 0:75W in sleep mode and take 3:5ms
to wake up [77, 106]. Radios have a bandwidth capacity of 100Mbps, which has to be shared
among downstream and upstream, consume 1:75W in transmit mode, 0:75W in receive mode,
0:01W in standby and take 5ms to wake up [103]. Therefore, the transceiver of an ONU takes
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Table 6.2: Energy consumption during one byte time.
Transceiver of ONU in wake mode
 
EO

30:8 10 9J
Transceiver of ONU in sleep mode
 
ESi ; i 2 O

6 10 9J
Transceiver of ONU when waking up
 
EWi ; i 2 O

30:8 10 9J
Radio of a wireless node in transmit mode
 
ET

140 10 9J
Radio of a wireless node in receive mode
 
ER

60 10 9J
Radio of a wireless node in standby
 
ESi ; i 2 W

0:8 10 9J
Radio of a wireless node when waking up
 
EWi ; i 2 W

140 10 9J
437500 byte times to wake up, while the transceiver of a wireless node takes 62500 byte times
to wake up.
6.4.2 Analysis of Results
In this section, the average network value, average energy efficiency and average bandwidth
allocation of the results obtained by formation processes, when applied to all the tested network
scenarios, will be analyzed. Conclusions will allow us to obtain insights on how energy efficient
routes can be created and where in the network it is more likely that route changes will produce
energy efficiency improvements. This will serve as a basis for the development of a heuristic
algorithm.
The average network values, 
 LE, obtained by the formation processes, are plotted in
Figure 6.1(a). As can be seen, all formation processes were able to obtain higher network values
than SP. FNF provides the highest average network value, approximately 0:02 106 more than
DNF. This means that FNF was able to overcome hidden profitable networks where DNF was
stuck and, as a result, network values were improved. As for SNF, an average network value
better than SP is obtained, although much smaller than the one obtained by DNF. Such result
means that the random method of SNF, to surpass hidden profitable networks, is not good
enough and ends up making uplink changes that do not produce network value improvements.
In fact, as shown in Figure 6.2, with higher values of  (see Section 6.2.1), the results of SNF
get worse in terms of average network value, 
 LE, average energy efficiency, Pi2W AiP
i2W ei
, and
average bandwidth allocation,
P
i2W 
A
iP
i2W i
.
Let us now look into the energy efficiency and bandwidth allocation ratio, shown in Figure
6.1(b) and Figure 6.1(c). From these plots, it is possible to state that the good network values
obtained by FNF are a consequence of the increase in both energy efficiency and bandwidth
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Figure 6.1: Average results of the tested formation processes and SP: (a) network value; (b) energy
efficiency; (c) allocation ratio.
allocation ratio. More specifically, the energy efficiency of FNF is 0:02  106 higher than the
one obtained by DNF. This means that FNF, in average, is able to send 20kB more than DNF for
each Joule, while slightly increasing the average bandwidth allocation ratio. When compared to
SP, FNF is able to send 80kBmore for each Joule, while having an average bandwidth allocation
ratio of almost 60% against 53% of SP.
The higher energy efficiency and higher bandwidth allocation results obtained by DNF and
FNF, when compared to SP, are due to a good selection of paths. More energy efficient paths,
avoiding congested areas of the network, are chosen. Concerning the number of hops, one
might think that DNF and FNF paths may become too long, when compared with SP, increasing
delays. However, as shown in Table 6.3, the average number of hops, of the paths obtained by
the formation processes, increased only marginally when compared to SP. In fact, if the number
of hops increased too much, then the energy efficiency could actually decrease, since traffic
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Figure 6.2: Effect that the parameter  of SNF has on: (a) network value; (b) energy efficiency; (c)
allocation ratio.
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Table 6.3: Average number of hops of the paths obtained by the several formation processes and SP.
Average number of hops
SP 1:495
DNF 1:585
SNF 1:914
FNF 1:604
would have to be forwarded through too many hops and more energy would be consumed to
deliver the same amount of traffic. This means that the average delays associated with the
formation processes and SP are expected to remain similar. These observations lead us to the
following assumption:
Claim 6.1 Surpassing hidden profitable networks in an accurate way, which is the case of FNF,
leads to significant increases in both energy efficiency and successful traffic delivery, while
maintaining similar delays.
In average, FNF obtains the best results. However, it is necessary to check whether or not
that observation still holds for different network conditions. In Figure 6.3, the results obtained
by DNF, SNF and FNF are compared with the results of SP, as the ratio of wireless routers
per gateway increases, jRjjGj . Note that these are average results considering all tested network
traffic loads. In terms of network value, Figure 6.3(a), FNF always obtains the best results for
any ratio of wireless routers per gateway. As for bandwidth allocation, Figure 6.3(c), FNF also
obtains the best results for any number of wireless routers per gateway, even if just by a small
margin. Regarding energy efficiency, Figure 6.3(b), both DNF and FNF have negative percent-
ages when jRjjGj < 3, meaning that they were not able to get better results than SP. This is so
because, in networks with a small number of wireless routers per gateway, there are not enough
alternative paths that can be exploited to improve energy efficiency and the only way to improve
network value is to balance traffic throughout the network, improving traffic successfully deliv-
ered. When 3  jRjjGj  4, DNF and FNF are similar to SP, i.e. there is no increase over SP.
From there on, i.e. for jRjjGj > 4, DNF and FNF always obtained better results than SP, while
FNF obtains better results than DNF. Hence, we may conclude the following:
Claim 6.2 FNF, in terms of network value and successful traffic delivery, always performs
better than SP, DNF and SNF for any number of wireless routers per gateway. As for energy
efficiency, FNF is also able to perform better, except when the network has a very low ratio of
wireless routers per gateway router.
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Figure 6.3: Effect that the number of wireless routers per gateway routers has on: (a) network value; (b)
energy efficiency; (c) bandwidth allocation ratio.
Another network condition that may affect the results is the network traffic load. In Figure
6.4, the results obtained by DNF, SNF and FNF can be compared with the results of SP for
different network traffic loads. Note that these are average results considering all possible ratios
of wireless routers per gateway. In what concerns to network value, Figure 6.4(a), and traffic
successfully delivered, Figure 6.4(c), FNF always obtains better results when compared to the
other methods. In terms of energy efficiency, Figure 6.4(b), when average traffic is low, 0:25,
DNF and FNF obtained lower results than SP. This means that when traffic load is low, it is
difficult to establish routes that can efficiently optimize the scheduled transmission, reception
and sleep periods. However, for higher traffic loads, FNF obtains better results than any of the
other methods. Therefore, we can assume the following:
Claim 6.3 FNF, when compared to SP, DNF and SNF, obtains better results in terms of net-
work value and successful traffic delivery for any network traffic load. As for energy efficiency,
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Figure 6.4: Effect that the tested loads have on: (a) network value; (b) energy efficiency; (c) bandwidth
allocation ratio.
the results of FNF are similar to the ones of SP and DNF when network traffic load is low,
however, when network traffic load is high, FNF achieves a better energy efficiency.
6.4.3 Computational Time
In general, FNF obtains the best results in terms of network value, energy efficiency and band-
width allocation ratio. However, it is also the most computationally expensive, even if only
three wireless routers are checked for a simultaneous uplink change. More specifically, con-
sidering that the front end has jRj wireless routers and the average node degree is d, then, on
average, the computational time of DNF depends on all possible link changes that have to be
checked: jRj d. As for SNF, and considering that the first stage will be run up to I iterations,
its computational time depends on jRj dI possible link changes. FNF, as already told, is much
90
6.4. COMPARISON OF NETWORK FORMATION PROCESSES
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
U
p
li
n
k
ch
an
ge
s
m
ad
e
at
th
e
se
co
n
d
p
h
as
e
of
F
N
F
(%
)
Component with
highest average
traffic load
Component with
highest average
node degree
Component with
highest average
traffic load or highest
average node degree
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more computationally expensive. If FNF checks a maximum of M simultaneous changes, then
it will have to consider, on average,
 jRj
M

dM possible link changes1.
FNF is, undoubtedly, more computationally expensive than the other formation processes,
despite also achieving the best overall results. However, it may happen that connection changes,
done at the second stage of FNF, do not occur evenly across all the network. According to
Figure 6.5, approximately 70% of connection changes done at the second stage of FNF involved
at least one wireless router that belongs to the component with the highest average traffic load.
Similarly, about 58% of connection changes done at the second stage of FNF involved at least
one wireless router that belongs to the component with the highest average node degree. When
combining both, almost 90% of connection changes done at the second stage of FNF involved
at least one wireless router that belongs to the component with either the highest average node
degree or with the highest average traffic load. Hence, we can assume the following:
Claim 6.4 Path changes at the second stage of FNF are significantly more common at compo-
nents with either the highest average node degree or with the highest average traffic load.
1Here,
 jRj
M

refers to the number of combinations ofM nodes from setR
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6.5 Network Formation Heuristic Algorithm
According to Claims 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, the FNF, when compared to the other formation processes,
obtains the best results except for a small number of situations. To tackle the high computational
time that FNF requires, a heuristic algorithm can be developed that detects and improves hidden
profitable networks only at components with the highest average node degree or highest average
traffic load, according to Claim 6.4. This way, only nodes that belong to such components need
to consume energy detecting and solving hidden profitable networks.
6.5.1 Heuristic Algorithm
For the operation of the heuristic algorithm, every node will have to acknowledge information
to all the other nodes. This includes traffic load, currently allocated bandwidth and established
route to the gateway. Such information can be exchanged through link state advertisements
(LSAs), similarly to other link state algorithms. The time between LSAs exchange can be
defined according to the network conditions. That is, a bursty network will need more LSA
exchanges, for more frequent network information update, while a less bursty network can
work properly with less LSA exchanges. Another possibility is to exchange LSAs whenever
changes occur (e.g. traffic load, bandwidth allocation or routes).2
This algorithm is assumed to start from a network with the connections of shortest paths
established. Every wireless router executes the heuristic algorithm, which is composed of two
stages:
First stage
The wireless router checks if it can improve its allocation value by switching the current uplink
to another one. Among all possible uplink changes, the one that brings the highest improvement
is adopted.
At this first stage, a wireless router i 2 R, searching for the uplink connection that brings
the best network value, needs to know how the other wireless nodes will be affected by its
link change in order to calculate the network and allocation value. However, not all nodes of
the FiWi access network will be affected by the uplink change of i. Only wireless nodes that
belong to the same dependency set will be affected. To understand the notion of dependency set,
let us consider Figure 6.6 that illustrates the switching possibilities for wireless router 1. When
2Note that the heuristic algorithm could also run centrally. In that case, every node would have to exchange
control messages with the central node for routes to be computed and established.
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1
x
Component C1
y
z
Component C2
Component C3
Alternative uplinks
Current uplink
Wireless router
Figure 6.6: Illustration of dependency set.
this wireless router is checking if link x brings a better network value, then the dependency set
includes all wireless routers in component C1. When link y is being tested, the dependency set
includes the wireless nodes from components C1 and C2. When link z is tested, the dependency
set includes the wireless nodes from components C1 and C3. In summary, the components
including the end nodes of links involved in the switching operation will be the ones that will
make up the dependency set.
If a wireless router can not find a better uplink, and if it belongs to a component with the
highest average node degree or highest average traffic load, then the algorithm will pass on to
the second stage.
Second stage
The wireless router will try to discover better outcomes that can only be reached if its uplink
connection is switched together with the uplink of other wireless routers, i.e. the wireless router
will try to detect and solve hidden profitable networks. Similarly to FNF, the proposed heuristic
algorithm considers a limited number of simultaneous uplink changes. If a better outcome is
found, then the wireless router switches its uplink to the new one and informs, through special
LSAs, all the affected wireless routers so that their uplinks are also changed.
At this stage, a wireless router i 2 R does not need to check all wireless routers of the FiWi
access network for simultaneous uplink connection changes. Only the wireless routers that can
affect i need to be considered. To understand which wireless routers are these, let us introduce
the term dependency super-set. The dependency super-set of a wireless router i 2 R is denoted
by Di and is the union of all dependency sets that result from all possible uplink changes of
i. In the example of Figure 6.6, the dependency super-set of wireless router 1 includes all
nodes from components C1, C2 and C3. The nodes that need to be considered for simultaneous
uplink change with i are the ones whose dependency super-sets intersect. For instance, if up to
three simultaneous uplink changes are allowed, M = 3, then only the wireless routers j 2 R
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and k 2 R that obey to the following condition will be considered for simultaneous uplink
connection change with i: Di \ Dj \ Dk 6= ;.
The computational time of the heuristic algorithm depends on the number of nodes having
dependency super-sets intersection. Since the intersection of dependency super-sets is com-
posed of entire components, the computational time depends on the number of possible link
changes involving the wireless nodes belonging to those components. That is, on average, n jRjjGj
M

dM link changes have to be considered, where M is the maximum number of simulta-
neous uplink changes, jRjjGj is the expected number of wireless routers per component, n is the
number of components that will be considered for simultaneous uplink changes and d is the
average node degree. As it will be shown in the next section, for small networks with a low
number of wireless routers and gateways, FNF and the heuristic algorithm are computationally
similar. However, for larger networks, with more wireless routers and gateways, the heuristic
algorithm will need less time than FNF. The algorithm is summarized in Figure 6.7.
6.5.2 Simulation and Results
The performance of the heuristic algorithm previously discussed will now be evaluated using
the test bed used to evaluate the formation processes in Section 6.4.
When analyzing the network values, energy efficiencies and bandwidth allocations obtained
by the heuristic algorithm (HA), DNF and FNF, shown in Figure 6.8, we can state that the per-
formance of HA is between DNF and FNF. The only exception is for the bandwidth allocation
ratio, which reflects the traffic successfully delivered. In that case, FNF and HA obtained simi-
lar results, with a difference smaller than one percent. This means that, in average, HA is able
to surpass hidden profitable networks, improving energy efficiency and bandwidth allocation,
when compared to DNF.
The effect that the number of wireless routers per gateway has on results is shown in Fig-
ure 6.9, while the effect of different loads is shown in Figure 6.10. Both these results are in
accordance to what is observed in Figure 6.8. That is, HA provides a network value and energy
efficiency (bytes per Joule) that are between DNF and FNF, while providing a successful traffic
delivery that is roughly equal to the one obtained by FNF, independently of the ratio jRjjGj or
network traffic load. Summarizing, HA solves many of the hidden profitable networks for any
network conditions, increasing energy efficiency and delivered traffic, when compared to DNF,
and gets close to the FNF results.
The computational time of formation processes, as aforementioned, is also an important
issue when energy consumption is a concern. That is because executing the formation pro-
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FirstStage
 
i;M;LE
/*Inputs:
i = node that will have its current uplink connection checked
M = maximum simultaneous uplink changes (required for second stage)
LE = currently established connections*/
l = current established uplink connection at i
l0 = wireless connection at i that provides the highest allocation value to i
if l 6= l0 then
LE = LE n flg	 [ fl0g
else if i belongs to a component with the highest average node degree or highest average
traffic load then
LE 0 = SecondStage  i;M;LE
if LE 6= LE 0 then
LE = LE 0
end if
end if
return LE
SecondStage
 
i;M;LE
/*Inputs:
i = node that will have its current uplink connection checked
M = maximum simultaneous uplink changes
LE = currently established connections*/
for all combinations of M wireless routers (i included) whose dependency super-sets inter-
sect do
X = set ofM selected wireless routers (i included)
lX = set of currently established uplink connections of every wireless router in X
l0X = set of uplink connections involving the wireless routers inX , that provides the highest
aggregated allocation value
if lX 6= l0X then
LE = LE n flXg	 [ fl0Xg
end if
return LE
end for
Figure 6.7: Heuristic algorithm to update uplink connection of i 2 R.
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Figure 6.8: Comparison between heuristic algorithm, DNF and FNF: (a) network value; (b) energy
efficiency; (c) bandwidth allocation ratio.
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Figure 6.9: Effect that the number of wireless routers per gateway router has on the heuristic algorithm
results: (a) network value; (b) energy efficiency; (c) bandwidth allocation ratio.
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Figure 6.10: Effect that the tested loads has on the heuristic algorithm results: (a) network value; (b)
energy efficiency; (c) bandwidth allocation ratio.
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Figure 6.11: Average time that DNF, FNF and HA take until no more path changes are made.
cesses also consumes energy and, as such, longer execution times will lead to higher energy
consumptions. The average processing time of the formation processes, which is the time until
no more path changes are made to the network, is shown in Figure 6.11 for different network
sizes. As can be observed, the HA is much faster than FNF, since only nodes that belong to
the component with the highest node degree or highest traffic load pass on to the second stage
of the algorithm. Also, in accordance with the expected computational time from the previ-
ous section, the difference in execution time between HA and FNF tends to increase for larger
networks. DNF, in turn, is faster than HA and FNF, since hidden profitable networks are not
detected. The question, however, is whether or not the higher energy efficiency obtained by
FNF and HA, when compared to DNF, compensates the longer execution time. Let us recall
that computing the formation processes also consumes energy, hence, longer execution times
lead to higher energy consumption. In cases where infrequent traffic load variations exist and,
therefore, infrequent bandwidth allocation variations also exist, the formation processes do not
have to be executed very often for routes to be updated. In that case, FNF and HA can be more
advantageous than DNF, since the longer execution time can be compensated by the higher
energy efficiency obtained.
It is possible to estimate the time interval during which no network condition variations may
occur, so that HA and FNF become more advantageous than DNF. To this end, let us introduce
the following notation, where alg refers to DNF, FNF or HA:
talg: Execution time of alg (seconds).
P : Average power (Watts) used during the execution of the formation process.
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alg: Joules per byte sent/received, which is a result of the energy efficiency obtained.3
algi : Bandwidth allocation of wireless node i 2 W obtained with the routes established by
alg.4
Using this notation, the energy consumed to execute DNF, FNF and HA can be calculated by
PtxDNF , Pt
x
FNF and Pt
x
HA, respectively. After all routes have been established, the energy
needed to send/receive  bytes with the routes established by DNF, FNF and HA is DNF ,
FNF and HA, respectively. Hence, HA will be more advantageous than DNF if the follow-
ing condition holds:
PtxDNF + DNF > Pt
x
HA + HA ,
, P t
x
DNF   txHA
HA   DNF > : (6.7)
This means that if the network conditions stay the same at least for a time interval equal to the
time required to send/receive  bytes, then HA will be more advantageous than DNF. The time
needed to send  bytes can be calculated by P
i2W 
HA
i
. Naturally, the same reasoning can be
applied for FNF, when compared to DNF:
P
txDNF   txFNF
FNF   DNF > :
The actual time interval, with no changes on network conditions, depends on the power
used during the execution, the execution time, the obtained energy efficiency and the bandwidth
allocation. The energy efficiency and bandwidth allocation, in turn, as analyzed in Section 6.4.2
and Section 6.5.2, depend on the ratio jRjjGj and on the average traffic load. Hence, ultimately, the
time interval with no changes on network conditions is very complex to determine and depends
on: the power used, the execution time, the energy efficiency variation according to jRjjGj , the
bandwidth allocation variation according to jRjjGj , the energy efficiency variation according to the
average traffic load and the bandwidth allocation variation according to the average traffic load.
In our test bed, the shortest time that HA needed for the network to stay stable, in order to be
more advantageous than DNF, was of 60 seconds, while the longest time was approximately 5
hours. As for FNF, when compared to DNF, the shortest time was of 128 seconds, while the
longest was of approximately 11 hours. Hence, HA will be more advantageous than FNF, since
3This is the inverse of the sent/received bytes per Joule introduced in expression (6.5).
4This bandwidth allocation is equal to Ai , that results from the paths established by the respective formation
process.
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the time needed for the network to stay stable is shorter.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter shows that routes in FiWi access networks can be chosen in order to optimize
sleeping and productive periods of all devices, increasing energy efficiency and successful traf-
fic delivery. The HA is able to establish those routes and it is shown that it is more energy
efficient than DNF, provided that network conditions do not change too often. The network
operator could choose in which conditions would DNF or HA be used, according to how often
conditions change.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, the energy efficient routing in FiWi access networks is addressed. A network
formation game theoretical model for energy efficiency was presented. This model was used
to test several network formation processes: DNF, SNF and FNF. From all these formation
processes, FNF obtained the highest energy efficiency. However, FNF is computationally the
most demanding. To address such demand, an analysis was done to understand where in the
network did FNF make the route changes that led to its highest energy efficiency. With this
analysis, it was possible to develop a heuristic algorithm that is computationally more efficient
than FNF and obtains results close to FNF in terms of energy efficiency.
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Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
This thesis contributes to the state of the art of FiWi access networks. Before delving into the
study and research of these networks, game theory and network formation theory are reviewed.
Concepts such as Nash equilibrium, network efficiency and stability are used throughout the
chapters and, as such, have been introduced. These mathematical tools revealed to be very use-
ful and powerful. Afterwards, a detailed state of the art on FiWi access networks is presented.
Following the presentation of all fundamental theoretical concepts and state of the art, an
initial study of FiWi access networks, through the use of a repeated game model, is presented.
More specifically, wireless routers were considered to be selfish players, mainly interested in
forwarding local traffic, and it was studied whether or not routers would cooperate by forward-
ing packets from each other. It was demonstrated that Nash equilibrium, where all routers
cooperate, is possible as long as certain conditions are verified. Conditions include having gate-
ways with a different objective, which is to forward as much traffic as possible from all wireless
routers, and having a discounting value high enough to deter any deviations. This served as an
initial showcase of a game theory application to a specific problem of FiWi access networks,
i.e. packet forwarding in an environment where all routers have their own interests.
Two important factors to improve performance of FiWi access networks with a wireless
mesh front end are: good resource allocation schemes and good routes establishment. Con-
cerning the allocation of resources, a bandwidth allocation algorithm has been proposed. The
proposed algorithm obtained good results, when compared to FIFO and WFQ, and revealed
to be agile by allowing several levels of protection to be configured. Moreover, protection is
provided to whichever routers are the less demanding, contrarily to WFQ that has to be recon-
figured in case of network condition changes, i.e. in case a previously less demanding router
changes its load and is now an over demanding router. The proposed algorithm is able to main-
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tain fairness in terms of bandwidth allocation and in terms of average waiting time of packets
in queue. That is because the proposed algorithm has a preventive behaviour relating excessive
traffic that will be dropped at subsequent hops, avoiding the waste of resources and the increase
of waiting time in queue of other packets.
Efficient routing schemes are also very important for FiWi access networks performance.
Concerning this topic, energy efficient routing is investigated and a heuristic algorithm is pro-
posed to achieve routes as energy efficient as possible without being too computationally ex-
pensive. The amount of bytes sent/received per each Joule consumed is higher when compared
with the shortest path algorithm. Such routes are reached by optimising sleep and productive
periods of all devices throughout the FiWi access network.
7.2 Future Work
The algorithm developed in Chapter 5 can be adjusted by means of a parameter termed drop
component threshold. This parameter controls howmuch protection is being provided to the less
demanding routers. The exact match between the drop component threshold and the protection
required by different services provided by the nodes needs to be investigated.
In Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6, new algorithms are developed and it is demonstrated that
good performances can be achieved. For those algorithms to be applied in real FiWi access
networks, signalling and timing issues need to be addressed. For instance, how often should
messages be exchanged, REQUEST and RESPONSE messages in the case of the algorithm
from Chapter 5, LSAs in the case of the proposal from Chapter 6, and what should be assumed
if some of these messages are lost.
In Section 6.4.2, it is shown that the alternative routes chosen by DNF, SNF and FNF are
only marginally longer than the shortest paths. This means that delays are expected to remain
similar. As such, special precautions related to delays may not be necessary. However, the
results could be different if wireless nodes had a much smaller energy consumption when com-
pared to the energy consumption of ONUs. That is, choosing much longer paths could be easily
compensated by putting ONUs in sleep, from an energetic point of view. In such case, delays
could increase considerably. It needs to be studied at which consumption levels of the wireless
nodes, relative to the consumption of ONUs, should delays be a concern.
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